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I.

INTRODUCTION

More than seventy years ago, Congress passed the first of the federal
securities laws, the 1933 Securities Act, which was quickly followed by the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and several others. These Acts, along with more
recent additions like the Williams Act and the Securities and Exchange
Commission's regulations, compel disclosures, such as a corporation's financial
condition, and restrict speech, such as unapproved proxy solicitations.'
When Congress passed these early laws, the First Amendment was thought
*Associate Professor and John S. Grimes Fellow, Indiana University School ofLaw-Indianapolis.
J.D., Stanford Law School; M.B.A., Simon Fraser University; B.Comm., McGill University. I am
grateful to Professors Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Robert Katz, Elizabeth Nowicki and George R.
Wright. and Katy Yang, Amelia Kalil, Rachel Rinehart. and participants at the University of South
Carolina symposium on the First Amendment and commercial speech for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper. I also thank Carmen Thomas, Kevin Couch, and Lucas Spivey for their work in
editing this piece.
1. See infra Part Ill.
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to be irrelevant to securities regulation because the Supreme Court had not yet
extended First Amendment coverage to government-compelled speech or
commercial speech. These later extensions of coverage posed a difficult question
regarding whether the First Amendment should also cover the speech affected
by securities regulation. The Supreme
Court, however, has so far managed to
3
avoid directly resolving the issue.
An impressive list of commentators has argued against the application of the
First Amendment to securities regulation.4 Some argued that the courts had
already foreclosed the application of the First Amendment to securities
regulation. Other arguments attempted to distinguish the speech covered by
securities regulation from more protected speech, or the subject matter of

2. "Speech affected by securities regulation" is a rather awkward way of expressing the subject
matter. It refers to the communication that may be mandated, prohibited, or simply chilled by securities
regulators. In the United States, the principal securities regulator, of course, is the Securities and
Exchange Commission. and the federal legislation is contained in the federal securities acts. Also, it is
worth noting that speech requirements or restrictions imposed by private self-regulating organizations
such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) are untouched by the First Amendment so long as there is no state action. Recent claims that
the actions of these self-regulatory organizations should be attributed to the state have been rejected.
See Steven J. Cleveland, The NYSE as State Actor?: Rational Actors, Behavioral Insights & Joint
Investigations,55 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 21-22. n. 119 (2005) (listing cases). This has not prevented some
lawyers from objecting to proposed NYSE rules on First Amendment grounds. See Jonathan D. Glater
& Landon Thomas, Jr.. ProposedRulesfor Analysts Raise the Ire of Publications,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2002, at C1 (reporting on periodicals' objections to a proposed rule that would in some
circumstances prevent analysts from speaking to journalists). More recently, however, the Court has
allowed even a state actor to restrict the First Amendment rights of those who are voluntarily members.
See Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy, 127 S. Ct. 2489. 2495 (2007).
availableat 2007 WL 1773196.
3. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted in a case that might have resolved tension between the First Amendment and
corporate speech); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181. 211 (1985) (resolving a challenge to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 based on narrow statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds); see
also Michael R. Siebecker, CorporateSpeech, Securities Regulation, and an InstitutionalApproach to
the FirstAmendment, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616 (2006) (arguing that securities regulation
would be the "track" for an impending First Amendment 'jurisprudential train wreck"): James C.
Goodale, The First Amendment and Securities Act: A Collision Course?. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 1983, at 1
(describing the First Amendment and securities regulation as on a "collision course").
4. See sources cited infra note 114.
5. See infra Part l.B. Frederick Schauer, for example, claims that securities regulation that affects
speech is outside the reach of the First Amendment. "The First Amendment just does not show up."
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769, 1777 79 (2004). There is no independent "First
Amendment-generated level of scrutiny." Id.at 1770. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92 (1982) (contrasting coverage of a right and protection of
that right). Put somewhat differently, the First Amendment might be applicable to securities regulation,
but the level of review would be no higher than that extended to any commercial regulation-rational
review-and thus the First Amendment's application would be functionally meaningless. Speech
affected by securities regulation would be like obscenity or defamation, a category of speech that can
be regulated because of its content, not a "categor[y] of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution."
R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (explaining that its statement that obscenity is not
a category of expression "within the area of constitutionally protected speech" is not "literally true").
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securities regulation-securities and capital markets-from other products and
markets enjoying First Amendment protection.6
The analysis of the First Amendment's application to securities regulation is
difficult in part due to the wide range of speech and speakers affected by
securities regulation.
Potential speakers include issuers, journalists,
shareholders, employees, investment advisors, and even investors themselves.
The type of speech that securities regulation can affect is similarly wide ranging.
Advertising in the context of a securities offering would appear to fit even the
narrowest definition of commercial speech. In contrast, the numbers on a
balance sheet are much more debatable. A corporation's comments on issues of
public concern-BP on global warning, Nike on sweatshop labor, Ford on
environmental protection-appear to be much more like political speech.8
Another difficulty in this analysis lies in the highly contested nature of the
commercial speech doctrine itself' and the wide range of viewpoints on the First

6. See infra Parts IV.A & B.
7. See infra Part lII.
8. For the purposes of this article it is unnecessary to resolve the definitional uncertainty between
commercial and higher value speech. See infra notes 33 39 and accompanying text. If the speech
affected by securities regulation is either commercial or political speech, ajustification is needed if the
First Amendment is to be inapplicable. For an argument that the speech affected by securities
regulation is indistinguishable from high value speech. see NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC (1990), and Nicholas Wolfson. The FirstAmendmentand the SEC,
20 CONN. L. REV. 265 (1988).
9. Some have argued that commercial speech should not be covered at all by the First
Amendment. See, e.g.. Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendmentand PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of the Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 353 (1978) (arguing that the
"proposals of commercial transactions.., is totally irrelevant to First Amendment values); Thomas IH.
Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries. Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (asserting that "the concept of a first amendment right of
personal autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops short of a seller hawking his wares"); see
also Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
476-80 (1985) (arguing for a confined ambit of First Amendment protection to ensure that it will
function effectively when most needed); Richard A. Posner. Free Speech in an Economic Perspective,
20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1. 39 (1986) (noting that it is possible that commercial advertising should
receive no constitutional protection); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of
the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1183 87 (1988) (expressing the opinion that
"commercial speech is located at least some distance from the core or cores of the First Amendment")
(internal quotation marks omitted). Others contend that commercial speech deserves greater than
intermediate-level protection, perhaps because such communication may be highly valued by the
recipients or because they believe there is no principled distinction between at least some kinds of
commercial speech and core protected speech. See, e.g.. Deborah J.La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First
Amendment Protectionfor Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2004); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 630 (1990);
Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Goodfor GeneralMotors: CorporateSpeech and
the Theory ofFree Expression.66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235. 237-38 (1998). It is also important that
commercial speech and corporate speech are not synonymous. An obvious difference is that commercial
speech may be spoken by other business forms, such as partnerships or sole proprietorships. Further,
not all corporate speech is commercial speech. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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Amendment's nature, purpose, and function.'0
This Article will not address the merits of existing commercial speech
jurisprudence. Rather, this Article will respond to those commentators who
argue that even with the current commercial speech doctrine, the First
Amendment should not apply to securities regulation." In other words, given the
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine the world as it is are there
reasons that would justify an exemption from the First Amendment for securities
regulations affecting speech?
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly examines the recent
evolution of the Supreme Court's approach to commercial speech and the
relatively few cases in which courts have applied the First Amendment to
securities regulation. It also addresses the common argument that the Supreme
Court has already effectively foreclosed the First Amendment's application to
securities regulation. Part 1II provides an overview, with examples, of how
federal securities regulation affects speech. Although securities regulation
focuses primarily on mandatory disclosure, a considerable portion also restricts
or burdens disclosure. Part IV evaluates justifications for a securities regulation
exception to the First Amendment. This part demonstrates that claims regarding
the unique nature of securities and the necessity for regulations affecting
disclosure to preserve U.S. capital markets are unpersuasive. Part V concludes.

10. See JOSEPH J. HEMMER, JR.. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (2006)
(identifying thirty-four First Amendment theories). Schauer also explains,
[I]f all of the historically recognized and judicially mentioned normative
theories [of the First Amendment] are available-self-expression, individual
autonomy, dissent, democratic deliberation, the search for truth, tolerance,
checking governmental abuse, and others-then their collective coverage is so
great as to be of little help in explaining the existing state of First Amendment
terrain. For if every underlying theory of the First Amendment can be conscripted
into service to justify either an inclusion or an exclusion, and if the array of such
theories is as large and diverse as it actually is, then all of the work is being done
not by the theories, but by as-of-yet unarticulated factors.
Schauer. supra note 5. at 1786.
1I.
In theory, whether the First Amendment is applicable to speech covered by securities
regulation is a question separate from the end result of the Amendment's application, and questions
"about the involvement of the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential
than are the issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech
to which it applies." Schauer, supra note 5, at 1767. In practice, however, commentators often merge
the analyses. See infranotes 126 30 and accompanying text. Accordingly, to some extent it is necessary
to address the possible consequences of extending the First Amendment to securities regulation. both
in terms of whether the regulations would survive scrutiny and whether they are even beneficial in the
first place. This is also necessary because , as Schauer has observed, "none of the existing normative
accounts appears to explain descriptively much of, let alone most of, the First Amendment's existing
inclusions and exclusions." Schauer, supra note 5. at 1785.
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COMMERCIAL SPEECH, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

CommercialSpeech Doctrine

12
Corporations have enjoyed constitutional rights for more than 120 years.
The right to First Amendment protection for a corporation's commercial speech,
however, was not extended until 1976 in the case of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 3 The Supreme Court
held that truthful speech that proposed a lawful commercial transaction deserved
constitutional protection. 4 The rationale, still used to justify the protection of
commercial speech, was based primarily on the listener's interests in hearing the
commercial speech. 5
Four years later in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the Court set forth a four-factor, intermediate level test for
determining the constitutionality of laws affecting commercial speech. 6 The
Court applied intermediate level scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny because
commercial speech was both hardier and of less importance than speech on

12. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (holding unanimously
that corporations are persons deserving protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). For a criticism
of this holding, see Reva Dibadj, The PoliticalEconomy of CommercialSpeech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 911,
923-24 (2007).
13. 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). Prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,protection had been
extended implicitly in other contexts: Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (finding
unconstitutional a Virginia statute penalizing an advertisement for abortion available in another state):
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,391 (1973) (finding that
sex discrimination in an advertisement is not protected speech under the First Amendment because sex
discrimination is illegal); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding the First
Amendment applicable to an advertisement in a corporation's newspaper). For a more thorough
discussion of the development of the commercial speech doctrine, see Antony Page & Katy Yang,
ControllingCorporateSpeech: Is Regulation FairDisclosure Unconstitutional?,39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1. 47-60 (2005).
14. Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy.425 U.S. at 773.
15. Id. at 759 (stating that recipients have a First Amendment right to receive information); see,
e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (noting "the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides" (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy. 425 U.S. at 763)); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (stating that "the First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising."
(citing First Nat'l Batk ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,783 (1978))): Lillian R. BeVier,A Comment
on Professor Wolfson's 'The FirstAmendment and the SEC', 20 CONN. L. REV. 325, 328 (1988)
(observing that the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy opinion "had its source in an empirical
observation about how much consumers care about political, as opposed to commercial, speech");
Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech. 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) ("The
Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be constitutionally protected so as to
safeguard the circulation of information. It has therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive
information, rather than on the rights of speakers.").
16. 447 U.S. at 556.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:789

matters of public concern. 17 The Central Hudson test requires a court to
determine "as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech concerns
unlawful activity or is misleading."' 8 Commercial speech that is false,
misleading, or related to an illegal activity receives no First Amendment
protection because listeners have no interest in receiving such speech. 19
If, however, "the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,"
then the Court inquires
"whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." If it
is, then [the Court] "determine[s] whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted," and,
finally, "whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest." Each of these latter three inquiries must be
answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found
constitutional.2 °
Although this test has been frequently criticized, not least by the Justices
themselves, it remains good law.2'
In addition to protecting against government restrictions on speech, the First
Amendment also protects against compelled speech,22 even when the compelled
speaker is a corporation. 23 The protection extended for compelled pure
commercial speech is generally low, in large part because compelled speech is
often necessary to reduce the risk of consumer deception through such

17. Id. at 564 n.6; see also Va. State Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 72 n.24 (providing that
political speech-commentary about governmental activities-on the other hand is easily "chilled" and
so must be protected); First Aat'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 776 (noting that speech on "'matters of
public concern'" is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection" (quoting Thornhill v. Ala., 310
U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
18. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quoting Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 566).
19. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 64 (1980) (observing that because commercial speech is
valued for conveying information, "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial
speech related to illegal activity." (citations omitted)). The Court has not yet clarified what it means by
misleading speech. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Pzffery Article Ever, 91 IoWA L. REV. 1395,

1420-27 (2006).
20. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566) (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 367 68 (applying Central Hudson while acknowledging that several Justices had
"expressed doubts" about the analysis).
22. See, e.g.. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C.. Inc., 487 U.S. 781. 795. 803 (1988)
(upholding a challenge to a state law requiring that fundraisers disclose the percentage of contributions
to be received by the charity); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,713 (1977) (declaring that "[t]he right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept
of 'individual freedom of mind."' (quoting W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943))).
23. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20 21 (1986);
United States v. United Foods. Inc., 533 U.S. 405. 408-09 (2001).
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compelled speech. 24 However, this has not stopped the Court from striking down
such regulations,25 or equating compelled commercial speech with compelled,
traditionally protected noncommercial speech.26
Although it is clear that the First Amendment applies to commercial speech,
it is much less clear what exactly constitutes commercial speech. Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy provided two definitions, characterizing commercial speech
either as speech communicating the sale of product X at price Y or speech
describing a lawful commercial transaction.27 Central Hudson provided a
broader definition: "[E]xpression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.,, 28 Later cases, however, sometimes went back to
earlier definitions.29 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has admitted that there
is no categorical definition distinguishing commercial and noncommercial
speech 3' and that "ambiguities may exist at the margins of the category of
commercial speech.",3 1 Commentators (and even other judges) have been far less
charitable.32
It is worth noting, however, that the concern is normally not distinguishing
between commercial speech and unprotected speech but instead distinguishing
between commercial speech and more protected speech. Justice Stevens, for
example, wrote that "it is important that the commercial speech concept not be
defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be
inadvertently suppressed., 33 Similarly, some of the critics of those who advocate

24. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626. 651 (1985) (holding that
..[warnings] or [disclaimers] might be appropriately required.., in order to dissipate the possibility
of consumer confusion or deception'" (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,201 (1982))); United Foods,
533 U.S. at 408. 416 (2001) (striking down a requirement that mushroom growers contribute to generic
advertising, in part because there was no possibility of consumer deception).
25. See, e.g., United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416.
26. Id. at 410 (citing numerous compelled speech cases that did not involve commercial speech).
27. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761.
770 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376.
385 (1973)).
28. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citations
omitted).
29. See, e.g.. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (describing
the proposal of a "commercial transaction" as the test for identifying commercial speech (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 762)).
30. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.. 514 U.S. 476. 493 (1995) (Stevens. J.. concurring) ("[T]he
borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed ....
);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 419 (1993).
31. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 765.
32. Kasky v. Nike, Inc.. 45 P.3d 243, 268 (Cal. 2002) (Brown. J.. dissenting) (observing that "the
United States Supreme Court has expressly refused to define the elements of commercial speech"). Not
everyone has objected to the indeterminacy. See generally Nat Stem, In Defense of the Imprecise
Definition of CommercialSpeech. 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 57 (1999) (arguing that the Court has developed
a flexible jurisprudence that allows the First Amendment to develop and evolve).
33. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (stating that courts must be "careful[] to ensure that speech
deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed").
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expanded First Amendment protection for securities regulation have focused
their efforts on distinguishing speech affected by securities regulation not from
commercial speech, but rather from traditionally more protected speech.34
The treatment of mixed speech, involving both commercial and
noncommercial messages, is also unclear. For example, Toyota advertising its
hybrid car is a commercial message. "Fight global warming" is a
noncommercial, political message. Toyota showing how you can and should
fight global warming by purchasing a hybrid car would likely be mixed speech.35
The degree of permissible regulation depends in part on whether the messages
are inseparable, or as the Court has stated, "inextricably intertwined., 36 The
Court has noted that state regulations do not get the benefit of intermediate level
First Amendment scrutiny for commercial speech that is inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully-protected speech.37 On the other hand, simply including
references to public issues is inadequate to immunize advertising from
government regulation. 38 The issue with speech affected by securities regulation,
however, is in the first instance between protected and unprotected speech rather
than the nuances of the applicable level of scrutiny.
Arguably, the distinction between commercial speech and more protected
speech has become less important over the last decade as the Supreme Court has
become increasingly protective of commercial speech.4 ° In a series of cases
involving commercial speech relating to liquor, 4 gambling,42 tobacco,4 3 and
prescription drugs,44 the government has lost. The actual level of review appears

34. See, e.g., BeVier. supra note 15, at 325-31 (arguing that commercial speech and political or
artistic speech can be distinguished based on the content and context of the speech); Michael P. Dooley,
The FirstAmendment and the SEC: A Comment, 20 CONN. L. REV. 335, 348 (1988).
35. For a long list of marketing and advertising communications that may be mixed speech, see
La Fetra, supra note 9, at 1230 36.
36. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (quoting Riley v. Nat'l
Fed'n of the Blind of N.C.. Inc., 487 U.S. 781. 796 (1988)).
37. Riley. 487 U.S. at 796.
38. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474 ("No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares
without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares."); Bolger,
463 U.S. at 67-68.
39. For an interesting discussion of the increasing importance of mixed speech in the context of
securities regulation, see Siebecker, supra note 3, at 621 28. See also Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited:
Can Commercial CorporationsEngage in Non-CommercialSpeech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 383 (2006)
(arguing that "all speech by publicly traded for-profit business corporations is commercial speech" but
leaving open whether and what level of First Amendment protection is appropriate).
40. See, e.g., Free Speech Protectionsfor Corporations:Competing in the Markets ofCommerce
andIdeas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272,2272 (2004) (noting that "commercial speech has enjoyed greater
protection in recent years"): Stern. supra note 32. at 68-72 (referring to the resurgence in the '90s of
commercial speech protection); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech andIntellectualProperty:Some
Thoughts afterEldred, 44 Liquormart, andBartnicki,40 Hous. L. REV. 697,732 (2003) (observing that
the Court "has been providing more and more protection [to commercial speech] since the early
1990s").
41. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484. 489 (1996).
42. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
43. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001).
44. Thompson v. W. State Med Ctr.. 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
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to be closer to a strict rather than an intermediate level of scrutiny.45 Conversely,
if commercial speech has become more protected, the distinction between
commercial speech and unprotected corporate speech (such as the speech
affected by securities regulation) becomes much more important. The next
section looks at how the courts to date have treated securities regulation under
the First Amendment.
B.

Courts' Treatment of Securities Regulation Under the FirstAmendment

Why the First Amendment might not or should not apply to securities
regulations would be primarily of interest only to academics if the Supreme
Court had already conclusively decided the issue. The Supreme Court, however,
has provided little guidance regarding the First Amendment's application to
securities regulation.
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that its application has been
foreclosed.46 For example, twenty-two prominent securities law professors
signed an amicus brief supporting the SEC in its case against Siebel Systems.4
The brief argued that there was an exception from the First Amendment for
securities regulation based on dicta from two early cases suggesting that the
amendment was inapplicable to at least some securities regulations.48
The more important dictum is from the 1978 case, Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar
Ass 'n49:

45. See, e.g, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Modelfor Commercial Speech and
Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2853 56 (2005) (arguing that in recent years protection
for commercial speech has moved towards strict scrutiny due to the Justices' current preference for
bright-line rules and changes in advertising that make it more expressive like protected art).
46. See, e.g., Allen Boyer, FreeSpeech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 474, 495 (1992) (reviewing WOLFSON, supra note 8) (claiming that "the [Supreme] Court has...
rejected any implication that the First Amendment should be applied in the securities field") (emphasis
added).
47. See Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 16 22,
SEC v. Siebel Sys.. Inc.. 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (2004). The list of signatories reads like a listing from a
Who's Who of securities professors: John C. Coffee, Jr., Alan R. Bromberg, James D. Cox, Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Jill E. Fisch, Theresa A. Gabaldon, Thomas Lee Hazen, Howell Jackson, Donald C.
Langevoort, Ronald M. Levin, Henry Monaghan, Donna M. Nagy, Neil M. Richards, Margaret V.
Sachs. Hillary A. Sale, Joel Seligman. Larry D. Soderquist, Marc 1. Steinberg. Lynn Stout. Steven Thel,
Robert B. Thompson. and William K.S. Wang. Id. Interestingly, although the brief referred to the
securities exemption as "obvious," the SEC chose to defend Regulation Fair Disclosure only in small
part on that basis, and primarily on the basis that it was actually a time, place, and manner restriction,
or was akin to commercial speech under the CentralHudson definition, or could survive strict scrutiny.
SEC Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 17-22, SEC v. Siebel Sys.. Inc.. 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. 04 CV 5130), 2004 WL 3142263.
48. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 47, at 17. These dicta are discussed infra at notes
49-61 and accompanying text.
49. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The brief also relied on the argument that many securities laws (and
commercial regulations in other areas of law, such as antitrust, sexual harassment and trademark) would
then also be constitutionally suspect. See Brief for Law Professors, supra note 50, at 17. This argument
is addressed infra at notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
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[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.
Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are
regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the
exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy
statements, the exchange of price and production information
among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the
labor activities of employees. Each of these examples illustrates
that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial
activity deemed harmful 50
to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity.
The foregoing appears in a case that was decided only two years after
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and two years before Central Hudson. In
other words, Ohralikwas decided well before the doctrine of commercial speech
was fully developed or began being applied more strictly. In addition, the
language hardly supports a blanket exemption for all securities regulation.
Rather, the speech covered by the language, "exchange of information about
securities" (and corporate proxy statements), is far from identical to all of the
speech covered by securities regulation. "Exchange of information about
securities" cannot, for example, cover a corporation's advertisements for
products, since such advertisements are squarely within the commercial speech
doctrine. Yet federal securities regulation reaches these advertisements.
Likewise Regulation FD applies to any material nonpublic information,5'
regardless of whether it can reasonably be said to be about a security.
The Court's language on its face would also include securities newsletters,
which have had some success litigating under the First Amendment. Of course,
the language on its face would also include investment columns in such
periodicals as the Wall Street Journal,Barron 's, and the New York Times that
have traditionally received the full measure of First Amendment protection.
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue with respect to securities
newsletters, the question was raised in Lowe v. SEC. 5 z This case was ultimately
decided based on a narrow statutory interpretation of the Investment Advisers

50. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted). This language was later quoted in part in Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758, n.5 (1985); however, the opinion only
received the support of three Justices. It was also recently quoted in Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass 'n v. BrentwoodAcademny. 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007), available at 2007 WL 1773196, in a
portion of the principal opinion joined by only four Justices. These four Justices noted that Ohralik's
holding was "narrow" and "limited to conduct that is inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct." Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Four other Justices agreed that Ohralik'sholding was
narrow but further limited it to "certain unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers that were
present in the circumstances of that case." Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2006).
52. 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985).
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Act of 1940, but the majority opinion also stated that "it is difficult to see why
the expression of an opinion about a marketable security should not" be
protected by the First Amendment.53 In a concurrence, Justice White, supported
by two other Justices, went even further. He would have held that the Act
violated the First Amendment because it operated as a prior restraint that was an
extreme means of preventing a mere possibility of fraud. 4
Dictum in the 1973 case, ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,5" may also shed
light on the meaning of the Ohralik dictum. The ParisAdult Theatre I language
is similar but distinctively different: "[B]oth Congress and state legislatures
have, for example, ...strictly regulated public expression by issuers of and
dealers in securities, profit sharing 'coupons,' and 'trading stamps,'
commanding what they must and must not publish and announce."56 The speech
covered in the phrase "public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities"
is much broader than the phrase "exchange of information about securities" with
respect to issuers and dealers and is inapplicable to the regulation of third
parties' speech other than dealers. The Court in Ohralik may have used narrower
and more precise language to cut back on the reach of any exemption.5
In addition, supporters of a securities exemption tend to leave out the
sentences immediately preceding the above quote. The Court wrote that
"legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions," and
such assumptions are the basis underlying Congress's and state legislatures'
lawful "regulation of commercial and business affairs."58 Now, however, with
modern financial theory, ready access to vast computational power, and an ever
increasing amount of data, there is some evidence regarding the validity of these
"unprovable assumptions."59 In any case, the Court has not hesitated in some
instances to adopt modern empirical findings that shed light on the efficacy of
securities regulation, such as in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,6 ° when it accepted a
plaintiffs fraud on the market theory based on the efficient capital market

53. Id. at 210 n.58.
54. Id.at 234 (White, J., concurring). The concurrence expressly left open the question ofwhether
the investment newsletter contained commercial speech or fully protected speech. Id.
55. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
56. Id.at 61 62 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
57. The language in Ohralik may also reflect the holding of First National Bank of Boston v.
Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). which was decidedjust one month earlier. In that case the Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny to regulation of corporate speech on matters "intimately related to the process of
governing." Id.at 786.
58. ParisAdult Theatre 1,413 U.S. at 61.
59. See infra Part IV.B. Admittedly there may not yet be enough evidence, especially since the
results are mixed, but in all likelihood the assumptions underlying securities regulation should no longer
be considered unprovable.
60. 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (accepting empirical studies suggesting that "the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information"). Justice White, however,
dissented from the majority's decision, arguing that federal courts had "no ability to test the validity of
empirical market studies" and should defer to Congress in "determining how modem economic theory
and global financial markets require" changes in established legal notions. Id.at 253 54 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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hypothesis.6
A related argument in favor of a securities regulation exemption has been
suggested by, among others, the First Circuit. In 1978, the appellate court stated,
"Though first amendment protection has lately been afforded some types of
commercial speech, the first amendment has not yet been held to limit regulation
in areas of extensive economic supervision, such as the securities, antitrust, and
transportation fields .... , 6 2 The D.C. Circuit later developed this argument:
We believe instead that the government may have the power to
regulate Stock Market Magazine, not because the articles are
"commercial speech," but rather because of the federal
government's broad powers to regulate the securities industry.
Where the federal government extensively regulates a field of
economic activity, communication of the regulated parties often
bears directly on the particular economic objectives sought by
the government, and regulation of such communications has
been upheld. If speech employed directly or indirectly to sell
securities were totally protected, any regulation of the securities
market would be infeasible and that result has long since been
rejected.63
Leaving aside the closing straw man argument (few commentators believe
that speech employed directly or indirectly to sell securities should be totally
protected), there appears to be more support for this kind of exemption. 64 The
Supreme Court has sometimes been more deferential of regulations affecting
speech in extensively regulated industries, such as the legal profession,6 5 fruit

61. Id.at 246.
62. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Conm'n, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1 st Cir.
1978) (citations omitted).
63. SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 372 73 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
The opinion goes on to acknowledge, however, that "we think it would be an overstatement to assert
that the First Amendment does not limit regulation in the securities field." but not so much that it was
even necessary to determine "whether the government's specific regulatory objective . . . is
constitutionally permissible." Id.at 373 (emphasis in original).
64. Schauer suggests that as a descriptive matter the presence of a well-entrenched regulatory
scheme has significance in determining the coverage of the First Amendment. See Schauer, supra note
5, at 1805 06.
65. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding state bar
disciplinary rule).
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667
growing," and
gambling.6
On the other hand, the government also extensively regulates both
prescription drugs and tobacco use, and the Supreme Court has recently struck
down regulations affecting those two industries.68 Before that, the Court struck
down regulations affecting alcohol and gambling.69 It seems safe to say that
extensive economic regulation is now less likely to justify a more deferential
application of the First Amendment and even less likely to justify a complete
exemption.
In addition, the D.C. Circuit's phrase, "speech employed directly or
indirectly to sell securities," is an imprecise term that is likely narrower than all
speech covered by securities regulation, "public expression by issuers of and
dealers in securities," or "exchange of information about securities and corporate
proxy statements., 7' Because ordinary advertising of goods and services (that
are not securities) to consumers (e.g., commercial speech) receives First
Amendment protection, such advertising should be considered speech indirectly
employed to sell securities. Presumably, image-building corporate advertising
would also receive such protection. Similarly, it is unlikely that the kind of
speech that appears in proxy statements is plausibly considered speech intended
to sell securities.
Finally, there exists competing dictum in a 1988 case. In Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,Inc.,7 the Supreme Court majority
implied that securities regulation did affect commercial speech 2: "Of course, the
dissent's analogy to the securities field entirely misses the point. Purely
commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements."
Since these cases, several courts have applied the First Amendment to cases

66. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.. 521 U.S. 457,469-72 (1997) (upholding
compelled contributions by fruit growers for generic advertising). Interestingly the Court struck down
a similar provision four years later involving mushrooms, an industry that was not heavily regulated.
United States v. United Foods, Inc.. 533 U.S. 405.416 (2001). More recently, the Court upheld a similar
provision involving the beef industry on the basis that the speech was government speech rather than
private party commercial speech. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
67. See Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328. 344 (1986)
(upholding prohibition of casino advertising). But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S.
484, 509 10 (Stevens, J., plurality) (concluding "that Posadas erroneously performed the First
Amendment analysis").
68. See, e.g.. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357. 360 (2002) (prescription drugs):
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 533 U.S. 525. 553 (2001) (tobacco). The case that jump-started the
commercial speech doctrine was also about prescription drugs. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749 50 (1976).
69. 44 Liquormart,Inc.. 517 U.S. at 489 (alcohol): Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United
States. 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (gambling).
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit was addressing a situation where
issuers may have provided consideration to a magazine for publishing favorable articles. See SEC v.
Wall St. Publ'g Inst.. Inc.. 851 F.2d 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The dispute was simply whether the
magazine had to disclose the consideration. Id.
71. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
72. Id. at 796 n.9 (citations omitted).
73. Id.
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involving regulations of publishers of investment advice 74 or journalists. 75 The
D.C. Circuit applied the First Amendment in a case involving an SEC regulation
restricting contributions and solicitations for contributions to political
campaigns. 7 6 Another court has avoided a constitutional challenge to a securities
regulation through statutory interpretation.
Even if the Supreme Court's nearly thirty-year-old dictum in Ohralik once
foreclosed application of the First Amendment to securities regulation, that does
not necessarily foreclose its application now. The SEC itself accepted in 1992
that there were "serious" First Amendment questions regarding some securities
regulations. 78 Furthermore, Schauer observes that as a descriptive matter there is
significant expansionary pressure on the coverage of the First Amendment.
Referring to this expansion as caused by the amendment's "magnetism," he
notes how this pressure "can be expected to bring issues into the First
Amendment that previously had been outside its domain," especially as "no
equivalent force pushes out those issues that had previously been inside."80
Accordingly, whatever the state of the law may have been, the question of the
First Amendment's application to securities regulation is an open one now.
111. SECURITIES REGULATION'S IMPACT ON SPEECH

As former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel has noted, "[s]ecurities

74. See, e.g.. Taucher v. Brown-Hruska, 396 F.3d 1168. 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's unsuccessful defense of a portion of the Commodities
Exchange Act against an as applied First Amendment challenge was reasonable and thus the award of
attorneys' fees under the Access to Justice Act was vacated); Commodity Trend Serv.. Inc. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that publishing
advice about investments in commodities was fully protected speech under the First Amendment);
Lubin v. Agora, 882 A.2d 833, 846 (Md. 2005) (rejecting the Maryland Securities Commissioner's
contention that subscribers to an investors' newsletter and email had a lower level of First Amendment
protection because it "may have been 'commercial speech,' possibly even false commercial speech").
Other courts have effectively applied rational review, either on a theory that the regulation is necessary
to prevent deception, as in United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1298 (D. Utah 2003), or
based on "the federal government's broad powers to regulate the securities industry," as in Wall St.
Publ'glnst., 851 F.2d at 372 (citations omitted).
75. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
76. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944-47 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that SEC's anti-"pay-to-play"
Rule G-37 survived strict First Amendment scrutiny).
77. SEC v. Siebel Sys.. Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 n.16 ("Since the complaint itself fails to
allege a cognizable cause of action for violation of Regulation FD, this Court declines to opine on the
constitutional challenges raised.").
78. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326,
Investment Company Act Release No. 19.031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,279 (Oct. 22. 1992); see also
Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the SEC "explained that the 'loopholes'
that remain [in Rule G-37] are due to its 4sensitivity' to First Amendment concerns").
79. See, e.g.. Schauer. supra note 5. at 1790-98 (explaining how issues become reclassified as
First Amendment issues); see also Blasi. supranote 9, at 479 ("As recently as 1957 our first amendment
tradition did not protect the freedom to form political associations or the freedom to speak
anonymously.").
80. Schauer. supra note 5. at 1796.
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regulation is essentially the regulation of speech."'" Frederick Schauer described
the SEC as the "Content Regulation Commission., 8 2 James Goodale pointed out
"there is no greater statutory regulation of speech than the '33 and '34 Securities
83
Acts and the '40 Investment Adviser and Investment Company Acts.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a complete description
of all the securities regulations affecting speech, a broad overview and examples
can be provided.
Typically, federal securities regulation is about mandating issuer disclosure.
Louis Loss and Joel Seligman in their influential treatise stated, "[T]here is the
recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again disclosure, and
still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But '[t]he truth shall
make you free.' 8 4 Obvious examples of this are the registration statement
requirements contained in the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the
mandatory reporting requirements contained in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act). Issuers and reporting companies are required to disclose a wide
range of business and financial information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
further extended reporting requirements in a variety of areas.85
Disclosure is generally required because it is material, and it "is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important" to an investment decision.86 Materiality is not determined solely by
the magnitude of the information. It may also be triggered by investors'
reactions to the information; thus, a director in the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance has suggested that even a small amount of business with countries or
governments facing U.S. economic sanctions will be considered material."
In the case of proxy statements, a company may be required to disclose a
shareholder's speech.88 Companies may normally exclude proposals that relate

81. Roberta S. Karmel, Introduction. The FirstAmendment and Government Regulation of
Economic Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). Citations to 55 Brooklyn Law Review refer to page
numbers as indicated on original printed pages.
82. Schauer. supra note 5. at 1778.
83. Goodale, supra note 3, at 1.
84. 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (3d ed. 1998); see also SEC
v.Capital Gains Research Bureau. Inc.. 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating that the federal securities laws
are premised on "a philosophy of full disclosure").
85. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)a (Supp. IV 2004)
(amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000)) (describing the disclosure
obligations of directors. officers, and principal shareholders); § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004)
(requiring management to disclose its assessment of internal controls).
86. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
87. Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Laura Unger, Acting
Chair. SEC (May 8. 2001). attachment to Letter from Laura S. Unger. Acting Chair, SEC, to
Congressman Frank P. Wolf (May 8, 2001), 2001 SEC No-Act LEXIS 579. at * 15. See generally
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securitiesand Exchange Commission and CorporateSocial Transparency,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1273 89 (1999) (arguing in favor of mandated corporate "social disclosure").
88. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8 (2006).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:789

to "ordinary business operations" 8 9 but generally must include those that focus
on "sufficiently significant social policy issues." 90 Institutional Shareholder
Services, a company that provides corporate governance advice, produces
background reports on proxy voting on such social policy issues as animal
welfare, board diversity, environmental change, human rights, and employment
issues."' Occasionally, shareholders' social policy proposals require a company
to include speech in its proxy statements that appears directly adverse to the
company's interests. For example, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., a large gun
manufacturer, was unable to exclude a shareholder proposal that requested the
board prepare a report "on company policies and procedures aimed at stemming
the incidence of gun violence in the United States." 92
Sometimes, however, and more controversially both from a theoretical
standpoint and from its potential ultimately to violate the First Amendment,
securities regulations not only mandate disclosure but also restrict disclosure.
For example, section 4(2) of the '33 Act provides an exemption from the
registration requirements for securities "not involving any public offering., 93 An
offering can still be large, both in financial terms and in the number of
participants, since buyers can include an unlimited number of accredited
investors. The issuer, however, generally cannot advertise, even if no ineligible
investors actually invest in the issuer, because Rule 502(c) requires that "neither
the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer
or sell the securities by
' 5
any form of general solicitation or general advertising. ,1
In the public offering context, offers may only be made by a prospectus, but
an offer is defined to include any written communication that might condition
the market. 96 This written communication, according to the SEC, includes
almost anything issued by the company, including written communication with
no direct connection to the securities offering, such as an increase in

89. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (listing several exceptions, including proposals concerning "ordinary
business operations").
90. StaffLegal Bulletin No. 14A, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Shareholder Proposals (July 12,2002),
availableat http://sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb 14a.htm (quoting Amendments to Rules on Shareholder
Proposals. Exchange Act Release No. 40,018,63 Fed. Reg. 29,106,29.108 (May 28. 1998)). There were
at least 179 social policy shareholder proposals voted on in the eight months ending August 2006. See
Proxy Governance News Release, Sept. 13, 2006, available at http://www.proxygovernance.com/
content/pgi/content/press/press release 20060913.shtml/.
91. Institutional Shareholder Services, Social Issues Services, http://www.issproxy.com/
research/usccustom.html (last visited June 15, 2007).
92. Sturm, Ruger & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 342, *2 3 (March 5,
2001).
93. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2). 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
94. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5389, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,251, 11,252 (March 16, 1982). For a thoughtful discussion of exempt offerings and why the
advertising restrictions should be scrapped on policy grounds, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaying
the Ban: It's Time to Allow GeneralSolicitation andAdvertising in Exempt Offerings. 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2004).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2006).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a) (2006).
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advertisements for an issuer's products.97 This explains why the time period
before a registration statement becomes effective is known as the "quiet
period."98 As the Wall Street Journal has observed, "in practice the rules can
deprive investors of information, prevent stock research from being published
and limit a company's ability to respond to misinformation in the media."99
Securities regulations restrict more than just advertising. Regulation FD, for
example, prevents a company from disclosing material nonpublic information to
certain parties unless the company also discloses such information publicly.0 0
The SEC in some situations prevents oil and gas companies from disclosing
either their probable reserves or any reserves that were proven based on
technology developed since 1978." In addition, companies are required to make
their estimates of reserves based on the year-end price rather than an average
price or their best prediction of what the price will be.' The result is that "[t]he
SEC doesn't allow companies to use all data at their disposal.' 1 3 The author of
this Article had first hand experience with this SEC rule when he was involved
with an oil company's initial public offering. All references to probable reserves
that were on the company's web site had to be deleted before the SEC would
allow the offering to proceed. Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported about
an unnamed company that had 658 million barrels of oil using modern
technology but was only permitted to disclose 261 million barrels under the SEC
guidelines.0 4 As the CEO of one firm of petroleum consultants noted, "it is easy
to see why investors can be confused or unintentionally misled" by the SEC's
disclosure requirements.0 5
Finally, securities regulations do more than just affect the speech of issuers.
For example, shareholders or employees of an issuer who "make a solicitation or

97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a) (2006) (exempting tombstone ads from the definition of prospectus).
98. Jesse Eisinger, 'Quiet Period' Ahead of IPOs Needs to End, WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 2004, at
C I (recommending the SEC should abandon the required quiet period).
99. Id.
100. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2006). See Page & Yang, supra note 13, at 8 18 for
a detailed discussion of Regulation FD's effects.
101. See Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.801 (2006); Daniel Yergin. Op-ed.. How Much Oil is
Really Down There?. WALL ST. J.. April 27, 2006, at A18. Proved or proven reserves are those for
which there is a 90% likelihood of recovery. See SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS, GUIDELINES FOR
THE EVALUATION OF PETROLEUM RESERVES AND RESOURCES 112, 134 (2001), available at
http://www.spe.org/spe-site/spe/spe/industry/reserves/GuidelinesEvaluationReservesResources 200
1.pdf. Probable reserves are those for which the likelihood is 50%. Id. at 135. This quantity is also
dependent on the price of oil, for the likelihood of recovery increases as the price increases. Id.at 113;
see also OIL AND GAS RESERVES COMMITTEE, SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS ET AL., PETROLEUM
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 42, 43 (2007), available at http://www.spe.org/spe-site/spe/spe/
industry/reserves/Petroleum Resources Management System 2007.pdf.
102. Steve LeVine, Oil Firms Want SEC to Loosen Reserve Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at
Cl.
103. Id. (quoting David Hobbs. Cambridge Energy Research Associates managing director for
oil and gas research).
104. Yergin, supra note 101.
105. Ron Harrell, Whose Reserves EstimatesCan I Trust?, WORLD ENERGY 104 (2004), available
at http://www.worldenergysource.com/articles/text/harrell WE v7nl.cfi.
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recommendation" must file a Tender Offer Solicitation/Recommendation
Statement on Schedule 14D-9.106 Such a filing may cost more than $50,000.107 A
high profile example of this situation occurred when employees of Willamette
Industries, facing a hostile tender offer from Weyerhaeuser, set up a website
(JustSayNoWey.com) opposing the transaction. 108 The employees took down the
site after the SEC asked them to "either retain legal counsel and file required
' 9
SEC forms, or cease all Just Say No Wey activities."10
As the group's
spokesperson observed, "[t]he SEC regulation says we can't make
recommendations as to the validity or merits of the takeover."" Rule 14d-9 can
thus effectively serve as a prohibition on speech.
IV.

ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT
APPLY TO SECURITIES REGULATION

SHOULD NOT

After the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,1'
commentators began writing about its implications for the application of the
First Amendment to other areas of law." 2 With respect to securities regulation,
in 1983 in an often-cited piece, James Goodale opined, "[o]ne trend is clear: the
SEC's regulation of securities will no longer enjoy an automatic immunity from
the dictates of the First Amendment."'" 13 Other commentators in the mid- and late
1980s and early 1990s argued in favor of First Amendment scrutiny, if not to the
entire field of securities regulation, at least in some areas. 1 4 More recently, in

106. 17 C.F.R. §240.14d-9(b)(1), (e)(1) (2006).
107. Robin Sidel, Web Site Draws SEC Concern in Bid Battle, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2001, at CL.
108. See SEC Takes Willamette Workers Out ofProxy Fight, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., May 4, 2001,
available athttp://seattle.bizjoumals.com/seattle/stories/2001/05/07/tidbits.html; see also Sidel. supra
note 107 (describing employee reaction to takeover bid). Although the employees' site was taken down
following the SEC's intervention, an archived version can be found at http://web.archive.org/web/
20010420084523/http://www.justsaynowey.com/.
109. SEC Takes Willamette Workers Out of Proxy Fight, supra note 108.
110. Id.
11. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
112. See, e.g.. Schauer, supranote 5, at 1781-84 (describing commentary in favor of expanding
the coverage of the First Amendment in the law of antitrust, labor, sexual harassment law, copyright,
and trademark).
113. Goodale, supra note 3, at 4.
114. See WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 5 (opining that "SEC-regulated" speech deserves First
Amendment protection) Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein. CorporateGovernance Speech andthe
FirstAmendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 163-65 (1994) (comparing corporate speech with political
speech); Aleta G. Estreicher, SecuritiesRegulation and the FirstAmendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 226
(1990) (arguing for the protection of securities advertising) Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation
andFreedomofthePress: Towarda Marketplaceofldeas in the Marketplace ofInvestment, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 843, 847 (1985) (arguing for more First Amendment protection for securities promotions); Burt
Neuborne, The FirstAmendment and Government Regulation of CapitalMarkets, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
5. 37 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme Court's approach to commercial speech regulation) Michael E.
Schoeman, The FirstAmendment andRestrictionson Advertising ofSecurities Under the SecuritiesAct
of 1933, 41 Bus. LAW. 377 (1986) (arguing that government restrictions on securities advertising is
unconstitutional); Wolfson, supra note 8, at 205-66 (arguing that there is no distinction between
commercial speech and political expression): Elizabeth Jean Holland, Note, Proxy Preclearanceand
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the wake of the Supreme Court's heightened vigilance in favor of commercial
speech,115 there has been a renewed interest.'' 6
Commentators have justified First Amendment scrutiny on several different
grounds. Nicholas Wolfson, for example, has argued that the speech affected by
securities regulation is indistinguishable from fully protected, 1 7 high value
political speech, and thus should be evaluated under strict scrutiny.
Aleta Estreicher partially disagreed, claiming that some speech affected by
securities regulation was distinguishable from high value speech based not on
the speaker's motive, but on the message's content." 8 If "the message
communicates a point of view or espouses something other than a commercial
transaction,""' 9 then it may be regulated "under principles that would be
applicable to any other expressive communication,
whether it be political,
2
religious, artistic or economic in content.', 1
Burt Neuborne proposed that securities regulation should be evaluated under
the First Amendment based on a listener-centered approach similar to that used
to justify First Amendment scrutiny of commercial speech regulations, rather
than to protect the corporate speaker's interests. 12 1 Under this approach,
regulations mandating disclosure are generally acceptable, as long "as the forced
disclosure is limited to information that is genuinely necessary to permit hearers

the First Amendment: The UnconstitutionalityofRule 14a-6, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1555. 1557 (1988)
(arguing that proxy preclearence is unconstitutional) Clark A. Remington. Note. A PoliticalSpeech
Exception to the Regulation of Proxy Solicitations, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1468 71 (1986)
(suggesting that certain proxy solicitations deserve more protection); Russell Gerard Ryan, Note, The
FederalSecuritiesLaws, the FirstAmendment, andCommercialSpeech: A Callfor Consistency, 59 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 57, 62 (1984) (concluding that SEC regulation of commercial speech is
unconstitutional).
115. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
116. Lloyd L. Drury, 111, Disclosure is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment
Constraintson SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757,758 (2007) (discussing Google's recent
violation of "an SEC-imposed quiet period"); Free Speech Protectionsfor Corporations,supra note
40, at n. 111 (discussing securities regulation as a "promising but undeveloped avenue through which
the Court might have, or might yet. parse the distinction between commercial and political speech is
the realm of securities regulations"); Page & Yang, supra note 13, at 8; Siebecker, supra note 3, at 616.
117. WOLFSON, supra note 8, at 157.
The rationale for the supposed constitutionality of such government restraint turns
on notions of the difference between commercial speech and political or artistic
speech or on some notions of regulation of professionals in the securities industry.
On analysis, the distinctions between commercial speech and other forms of
expression. and notions of professional regulation do not stand up.... [S]peech
regulated by the SEC is not commercial speech as traditionally defined, and is
indistinguishable from fully protected speech.
Id.;
see also Wolfson, supranote 8, at 256 66 (arguing that no distinction exists between commercial
speech and political expression).
118. Estreicher, supra note 114, at 259.
119. d.at 258.
120. Id.at 259.
121. Neuborne, supra note 114. at 51-62.
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to make informed and autonomous choices."' 122 By contrast, restrictions 12on
3
speech before and after a prospectus has been filed should not be permissible.
Several commentators (or litigants) have responded with arguments against
the First Amendment's application to securities regulation. 24 These responses
were largely based either on distinctions between the capital markets and
securities on the one hand and other markets and their "products" on the other,
or due to predictions regarding
the impact on capital markets if securities
25
regulations were struck down. 1
This last argument in particular appears on its face less like an argument
about whether the First Amendment should be applied to securities regulation in
the first instance and more like an argument about why a First Amendment
challenge should fail. These are really two different questions: "[W]hether there
are constitutional constraints on Congress's power to regulate the interstate
distribution and trading of corporate securities and, if so, whether the existing
regulatory scheme exceeds those constraints."' 26 The answers depend, to use
Frederick Schauer's terms, on the First Amendment's "coverage" and
"protection," or its "[w]idth and [d]epth."' 2
The answer to the first question (does the First Amendment apply to
securities regulation?), however, may well depend on the answer to a second
question (would some securities regulations be struck down?), which would turn

122. Id. at 61 62. Neuborne's standard is similarto the Court's definition ofmateriality. Seesupra
notes 86-57.
123. Neuborne, supra note 114, at 61.
124. See supra notes 5, 15, and 47; see also Robert W. McChesney, The New Theology of the
First Amendment: Class Privilege over Democracy, 49 MONTHLY REVIEW 17, 18 (arguing that
democratic interpretation of the First Amendment should not extend its protection to commercial
activities); Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for The
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 80 (1989) (arguing that First Amendment analysis should not apply
to securities): Siebecker. supra note 3, at 621 (arguing that First Amendment protection should not
extend to securities regulation based on an institutional approach); Brief of Law Professors, supra note
47, at 16 22. 1 am not addressing here the more generalized arguments against the First Amendment's
application to commercial speech. See sources cited supra note 9. To reiterate, my more modest goal
is to address the arguments against the First Amendment's application to securities regulation, given
the backdrop of the existing commercial speech doctrine.
125. See, e.g., Siebecker, supra note 3, at 651 (focusing "on the effects that granting full First
Amendment protection to politically tinged corporate speech would have on the system of mandatory
disclosure and reporting under existing securities laws").
126. Dooley, supra note 34, at 335.
127. Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict RationalBasis Scrutiny, 74
U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1340 (2003) (italicized in original). Typically the First Amendment's coverage
is deeper than it is wide. Id. at 1341. For example. Herz notes that Justice Black was commonly known
as a "First Amendment absolutist," meaning that he was fiercely protective of speech. Id. at 1341-42
(internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 75 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the First Amendment "'absolutely' forbids" laws abridging the freedom of
speech "without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or whereases"'). This strong protection was provided, however, only
if Justice Black thought that the speech was covered by the First Amendment: because he frequently
thought it was not covered, he could be said to favor a narrow but deep First Amendment. Herz, supra,
at 1340-41. See also McChesney, supra note 124, at 22 (observing that "even the most strident
'absolutist' cannot avoid determining what speech qualifies" for First Amendment protection).
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in part on the likely consequences if securities regulations were struck down.
Schauer has also suggested that securities regulation (and other speech that is not
yet covered by the First Amendment) 128 is largely not covered due to nonlegal
factors:
[N]onlegal factors, far more than legal ones, determine which
opportunistic claims to First Amendment attention will succeed
and which will not. Legal doctrine and free speech theory may
explain what is protected within the First Amendment's
boundaries, but the location of the boundaries themselves-the
threshold determination of what is a First Amendment case and
what is not-is less a doctrinal129 matter than a political,
economic, social, and cultural one.
Accordingly, he suggests that looking at "the political, sociological, cultural,
historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First Amendment
exists and out of which it has developed" might be more useful in determining
its boundaries than any underlying doctrinal theory. 13 If Schauer is correct, this
implies that the necessity of regulations affecting speech to the effective
functioning of the capital markets would matter greatly in determining whether
the First Amendment should reach securities regulation.
A.

Information-DependentNature of Securities

A group of arguments against the First Amendment's application to
securities regulation are based on the claim that there are distinctive
information-related features of the capital markets and securities that distinguish
them from other markets and goods. Arthur Pinto argues that even given the
"development of the first amendment in the commercial speech area, its
application to securities law and the capital markets is inappropriate because

128. John Fee lists some areas of law "that routinely regulate the content of private expression
in specific contexts, which are not typically thought to infringe the First Amendment. These include
antitrust law, securities law, labor law, workplace harassment law, rules of evidence, copyright and
trademark law, panhandling restrictions, regulation of building architecture, court rules governing the
citation of unpublished precedent, and rules of decorum in public meetings." John Fee. Speech
Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1103, 1147-48 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
129. Schauer, supra note 5, at 1765 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id.
at 1787. Schauer in fact recommends, as an additional layer of First Amendment analysis,
an institutional approach in which courts would be sensitive to such factors. Frederick Schauer, Towards
an InstitutionalFirst Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1256, 1263 n.43 (2005) (specifying broadcasting
and military speech as two situations where the courts already take an institutional approach); see also
BeVier, supra note 15, at 328 (arguing that First Amendment analysis depends on the market for
information in each institutional setting): Daniel Halberstam. CommercialSpeech, ProfessionalSpeech,
andthe ConstitutionalStatus ofSocialInstitutions.147 U. PA. L. REv. 771,857 (1999) (suggesting that
"professional and commercial speech [should be] viewed as bounded speech institutions"). Michael
Siebecker has applied Schauer's institutional analysis to conclude that the First Amendment should not
apply to securities regulation. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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speech in the market differs from other forms of commercial speech."''
The capital market is different from "consumer" or "products" markets,
according to Pinto, because of the nature of securities. 132 He draws a distinction
between choosing to buy a share of General Motors and choosing to buy a
General Motors car. 13 3 A share is intangible and "cannot be consumed,
inspected, or verified.' 134 Its value depends in large part on firm-specific
information, much of which comes directly from the company. 135 By contrast, a

131. Pinto,supra note 124, at 81. Pinto does in fact concede that proxy and tender offer rules may
trench upon high value political speech, and thus warrant a "greater justification." Id. at 100. More
generally, he accepts that "[ft]he vast majority of battles for control ... deal fundamentally with issues
of an investor's economic interests that may have a political dimension." Id. He concludes that if these
"battles are 'inextricably intertwined' with traditionally protected speech, then the SEC should limit its
reach." Id. at 101 (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C.. Inc., 487 U.S. 787. 796 (1988)).
He does not, however, explain whether this would be traditional strict scrutiny or some intermediate
scrutiny requiring a "greater justification" (i.e., requiring the SEC to have more substantial "ends").
132. Id. at 77-88.
133. Id. at 83.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id. at 83 (observing that the value of"General Motors stock depends upon the investor's
ability to demand and receive accurate, complete disclosure about the business from the firm and to
verify that information"). Boyer likewise attempts to distinguish speech covered by securities regulation
from commercial speech, but on the grounds that securities are contracts. He elaborates:
The statements that are publicized as part of the disclosure process function
as warranties. The prospectus cannot be viewed as a pure advertisement, nor the
registration statement as a mere announcement, because the offering is not
embodied in an artifact that can be distinguished from the description offered in
the documents. The offering consists in the representations made in these
documents. Requiring disclosure, thus, is a means of assuring that a security is
what it is represented to be. and it assures that there is force and validity to those
representations.
Boyer, supra note 46, at 483.
Presumably the argument is that when an investor buys a security, what is actually being
purchased is determined by everything that must be disclosed: the risk factors, the financial history and
management's discussion and analysis of the business, and so on. Id. It is much less clear that what is
being purchased should also be determined by extraneous information also affected by securities
regulation. such as an unrelated press interview with the founder. See, e.g.. David Bank. Disquiet
Period: Salesforce.com 1PO Is Delayed, WALL ST. J., May 20. 2004. at C5 (reporting on
Salesforce.com's delayed IPO as a result of a New York Times interview of the CEO); Kevin J. Delaney
et al., Google IPO May Face New Hurdle,WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2004, at C I (describing SEC scrutiny
of company founders' interview with Playboy magazine). Even more clearly, a company's ads for its
products cannot be considered as defining the company's securities. See supra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text. At most, the argument appears to support only an exemption from the First
Amendment for registration statements and prospectuses. In addition, the argument seems even more
stretched for a debt security, where what is being sold is a promise to pay interest and repay the
principal, and the terms and conditions of the offering are embodied in like the indenture.
Boyer's argument would appear to apply to many things that are typically not securities as well,
like life, medical, or car insurance, a mortgage, or even a checking or savings account. It might also
apply to any product with a warranty, because when consumers buy such a product they are also buying
the credit and performance risk associated with the company delivering on the warranty. Finally, it
would also seem applicable to products like commercial software, which actually consist of computer
code incomprehensible to the vast majority of users, but which are described in practice by owners'
manuals, text help files, or even advertisements. It does not appear to be so much an argument that
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car can be evaluated both directly based on a driver's experience and indirectly
because experts or auto mechanics can test the vehicle and report their
experiences.' 36 Fraud in the sales of cars can be readily discovered, whereas
discovering fraud in the sales of securities will be much more difficult. 3 7 In
short, "[t]here is a greater potential for fraud and manipulation in a market so
dependent upon the seller.' ' 8 Boyer likewise argues that "the heightened risk of

speech affected by securities regulation should not be covered by the First Amendment, as an argument
that the SEC's regulations are permissible to ensure that a sale of a security (like the sale of any good
or service) is not misleading.
Boyer also argues that securities are different because the representations that fall within the scope
of SEC regulation "inextricably involve conduct: the issuing of securities." Boyer, supra note 46, at
484. Relying on United States v. O'Brien.391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). Boyer claims that such "speech
may be denied First Amendment protection" because the "burning of a draft card may metaphorically
be viewed as the mirror image of printing a securities prospectus. The same reasoning that permits the
state to forbid the former act allows it to require the disclosure entailed by the latter." Boyer, supra note
46, at 484. He reads O'Brien together with Zauderer to "suggest that a communicative act can be
regulated-and in the case of securities disclosure. required-on the basis of the non-communicative
conduct that it entails." Id. at 485.
First, the noncommunicative conduct is the issuance of securities, but this is only relevant for the
speech affected under the '33 Act. Other securities regulation affects speech that is not linked to the
initial issuance of securities. Second, the speech and conduct, unlike burning a draft card, hardly seem
inextricably intertwined; the state can simply pursue the conduct. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (quoting Riley, 487 U.S. at 796). Third, even though Boyer asserts that
this activity may be denied First Amendment protection. the activity actually isprotected based on a
four-part test that closely resembles the CentralHudsontest applied to commercial speech. See O'Brien.
391 U.S. at 377 ("[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."); see also Making Sense of Hybrid Speech, supra note 45, at 2837, 2845
(noting how the Central Hudson and O'Brien four-factor tests closely parallel each other).
136. Pinto, supra note 124, at 83.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 84. Pinto claims that the securities laws are a form of consumer protection legislation,
as "Congress was particularly concerned with restoring the confidence of investors in the capital
markets.... Federal securities laws are aimed at preventing manipulation of the markets and providing
full disclosure, which would often not be otherwise available, for those who invest and trade in
securities." Id. at 82. The argument, even if Pinto's claim is accepted, really only implies that the
purpose of the laws should be taken into account by courts when judging securities regulation under the
First Amendment, just as it is with other consumer protection statutes. Thus state regulation of
misleading or unduly assertive sales practices or advertisements have survived First Amendment
challenge. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding a thirty day waiting
period to protect accident victims from lawyers using direct mail solicitations); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz.. 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that "advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket
suppression" but that "[a]dvertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to
restraint"); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) (noting that the state may require advertisements to "appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive"): Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180. 185. 224-25 (1997) (applying the First
Amendment to provisions of the Cable Television ConsumerProtectionand Competition Act of 1992
but holding that it passed constitutional muster). Many commentators, however, strongly reject the
claim that securities regulations are about consumer protection. See, e.g.. Zohar Goshen & Gideon
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fraud and the market's need for accurate information overshadow assertions that
the First Amendment applies."' 39
More generally, Pinto contends that securities are "credence goods,"
meaning their "qualities are difficult to discover by inspection or use, thus
rendering the buyer dependent upon the seller."'14 The analogy, however, is
weak. Typically credence goods or services involve situations where ex post the
buyers do not know both whether they needed the good or service and whether
the good or service was even provided. 4 ' The quintessential example involves
auto repairs. The car owner may not know if she needed a new part or simply an
adjustment, and assuming the repair works, she may not even know what service
the mechanic actually provided.' 42 Another example involves medical
procedures; thus, doctors may perform fewer unnecessary procedures on other
doctors, in theory at least, because other143doctors are more likely to know
whether the procedure is actually necessary.
A buyer of securities, however, typically knows she needs or wants the
security (i.e., a return on her investment) and actually owns the security but is
only uncertain of the security's value, or more precisely, whether its market
value is correct. 1 44 This uncertainty involves a matter of degree, however, rather

Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711. 713 (2006) ("Any
serious examination of the role and function of securities regulation must sidestep the widespread, yet
misguided, beliefthat securities regulation aims at protecting the common investor. Securities regulation
is not a consumer protection law.") (footnote omitted).
139. Boyer, supra note 46, at 489 (mergers & acquisitions context); see also BeVier, supra note
15, at 328 29 (arguing that the securities market and its market for information are different from the
consumer goods market (and its market for information), and both markets in turn are different from
the political market (and its market for information)).
140. Pinto. supra note 124, at 84 (citing Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An EconomicAnalysis
of the Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 530-31 (1979)). This is in contrast to
"inspection" or search goods "whose quality and fitness are ascertainable by inspection before sale"
such as clothing or "experience' goods whose qualities are revealed by use" such as food. Id. See
generally Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni. Free Competitionand the OptimalAmount of Fraud,16 J .L.
& EcON. 67. 68-72 (1973) (discussing how search, experience, and credence qualities of goods affect
consumer behavior). Although the term is typically credence good, examples commonly listed in the
literature involve doctors. lawyers, cab drivers and auto mechanics and might be better described as
credence services. See, e.g., Sawbones, Cowboys and Cheats. THE ECONOMIST. April 15, 2006. at 78
(identifying classes of experts whose services represent "'credence goods,' because customers take it
on faith that the supplier has given them what they need, and no more").
141. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and ComputerSpecialists:
The Economics of Credence Goods, 64 J. ECON. LIT., Mar. 2006, at 5. 7.
142. Id. at5 6.
143. Sawbones, Cowboys and Cheats, supra note 140 (discussing a series of Italian studies
performed by Gianfranco Domenighetti that found the more sophisticated the patient, the fewer
operations surgeons performed).
144. Buyers who do not know what securities they need can use an investment adviser and are
then protected by the adviser's fiduciary duties to them. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963).
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than kind; all investments are uncertain in some respects,' 45 regardless of the
amount of disclosure. With less (or less useful) disclosure, the investor will be
more likely to be uncertain about firm-specific risks.' 46 Furthermore, although
investors will likely want some disclosure,
they desire only those disclosures
147
where the benefits exceed the costs.

To the degree Pinto's analysis is correct, one must remember that investors
are likely to pay more for shares in a company that discloses information, and
commits to disclose information in the future, as opposed to a company which
does not. Companies, in fact, have a strong incentive to credibly disclose
relevant information in order to lower their cost of capital. 48 At least in the

145. Even U.S. Treasury bills, commonly referred to as a risk-free investment, face credit risk
because there is a non-zero possibility that the government will default. See, e.g.. Risk-Free Bonds
Aren't, Posted by Eliezer Yudkowsky, 06:30 p.m.,
June 22,
2007,
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/06/risk-free-bonds.html#more.
146. There is a similarity to product markets here too. A consumer buying a car may believe that
it will be reliable and will last ten years, but in fact it may last only six years or as many as fifteen years.
and it may need few or many repairs. Whether the consumer's belief was justified, however, will not
be known for many years. Likewise, an investor may believe that the company will pay all interest and
principal due on a ten-year bond, but only time will actually demonstrate that. One can in fact argue that
uncertainty is more important in the product market because diversification is harder (i.e.. many people
cannot afford to buy two cars). In the capital market investors can diversify easily, which means firmspecific risk goes uncompensated. See infra notes 163 66 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED, HOW To Fix IT (2006) ("Although investors do not like to be defrauded and do want
some regulation, they will find such regulation valuable only if the benefit from reduced fraud is greater
than the cost of compliance by the firms they invest in."). Former Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin
recognized the tradeoff: "Our society seems to have an increased tendency to want to eliminate or
minimize risk, instead of making cost/benefit judgments on risk reduction in order to achieve optimal
balances." Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Treasury Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson on the Competitiveness ofU.S. Capital Markets, Economic Club
of New York, (Nov. 20. 2006) (quoting former Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your
Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerningthe Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus
Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 334 (2003) (noting that "[fi]nvestors pay dearly for [the U.S.
regulatory] infrastructure but do not receive the safeguards and other protections they are told they
might receive"). After all, if one really wanted to deter investment fraud, one could impose draconian
punishments. See, e.g., Chinese Businessman Gets Deathfor Bogus Ant-BreedingScheme, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252141,00.html (reporting
that an executive was sentenced to death for defrauding investors). Concededly. corporate disclosure
may have benefits for parties other than investors: however, there is little research on this matter.
148. This point has been made frequently. Two prominent analyses are Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel's Mandatory Disclosure and the Protectionof Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683
(1984). which argued that firms have an incentive to disclose information because "[i]nvestors [faced
with a firm's silence] would assume the worst, [reasoning] that if the firm had anything good to say for
itself it would do so," and Steven A. Ross's DisclosureRegulation in FinancialMarkets: Implications
of Modern Finance Theory andSignaling Theory, in ISSUES INFINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 183 88
(Franklin Edwards ed.. 1979), which argued that in a competitive market managers have an economic
incentive to distinguish their firms by disclosing information. This view has also been extensively
criticized, in that even though issuers may have incentives, information may still be underdisclosed due
to externalities. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1393 95 (1999) (arguing that an "issuer
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initial public offering context, "there is strong evidence that investor
informational demands often propel issuers to provide disclosure at levels
beyond that mandated as a private, contractual matter."' 49 Peter Spencer,
although agreeing that all financial assets and services should be classified as
credence goods, also claims that investors "only buy equities if we believe that
the company is sound and we trust the management," which will depend in large
part on disclosure.15 0 In addition, even for credence goods and services,
customers will typically know of the supplier's incentives, and assuming they
151
act on this knowledge, some of the problems with such goods are eliminated.
In some ways there is a useful analogy between shares and used cars. As
George Akerlof explained in his famous article, The Market for "Lemons ":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,12 given asymmetrical
information (where one party has more and better information than the other),
less valuable used cars would drive more valuable used cars from the market,
resulting in the market's collapse.5 3 Akerlof's analysis applies to most markets,
because most markets involve some level of asymmetric information.5 4 The fact
that there is a thriving market for used cars simply means that buyers and sellers
have found other ways of reducing the information asymmetry, such as bonding
and warranties. 155 Similarly, it is in the interests of both investors and issuers to

choice system" of disclosure would result in less disclosure than a mandatory system and that the
proponents of"issuer choice" should produce empirical evidence that mandatory disclosure causes more
harm than benefits).
149. Alan R. Palmiter, TowardDisclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1999).
U.S. issuers have increasingly shunned public offerings in favor of private
offerings to avoid the costs of mandatory disclosure and heightened liability. But
in making private offerings, many issuers disclose voluntarily at the same or
higher levels compared to regulated registered offerings. Moreover, issuers in
public offerings often disclose information voluntarily beyond that required so as
to increase investor confidence. In short, the disclosure demands of investors and
their intermediaries-not the distortions of mandatory disclosure-govern the
supply of information in securities offerings.
Id.at 5 6 (citations omitted); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Casefor
a Mandatory DisclosureSystem, 70 VA. L. REV. 717,746 (1984) (agreeing that the "theory ofvoluntary
disclosure does seem to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent.
to all primary distributions" but claiming that the theory is "far less persuasive" when applied to the
disclosure regulated by the '34 Act).
150. PETER SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 8 (2000).
151. See Dulleck & Kerschbamer. supranote 141, at 7-8.
152. George A. Akerlof. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). George Akerlof was awarded the 2001 Prize in Economics in
memory of Alfred Nobel for this article.
153. Id. at 490.
154. See George A. Akerlof. Writingthe "The Marketfor 'Lemons ": A Personaland-Interpretive
Essay, Nov. 14, 2003, http://nobelprize.org/cgibin/print?from=/nobel prizes/economics/articles/
akerlof/index.html.
155. Akerlof. supra note 152. at 499.
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reduce the information asymmetry. 156 Mandatory government regulation is not
necessarily required to reduce the information 15problem
contracting and
7
information intermediaries (monitors) can also work.
A company can ensure that information is monitored or otherwise vouched
for by underwriters, accountants, bankers, lawyers, or even insurers. 158 For
example, a recent study demonstrated that bank loans, through bank monitoring
of companies, add value for shareholders.5 9 Another study found that even "in
the absence of mandated disclosures, capital markets can discriminate between
firms with high and low probabilities of internal control problems" based on the

156. This mutual incentive between buyer and seller helps explain why it is rare for a buyer to be
denied the opportunity to test drive a car before purchasing.
157. Pinto recognizes that effective monitors are important. but argues that this may be too costly
since the issuers are the source of the information. Pinto. supra note 124. at 85. This assumes that for
some reason the issuers are opposed to the monitoring, or put differently, that the benefits of committing
fraud are higher than the benefits of accurate stock information. He also baldly asserts that there is a
"lack of effective private monitors in the capital markets." Id. at 87.
158. See, e.g.. Larry E. Ribstein. LimitedLiabilityofProfessionalFirmsAfter Enron, 29 J. CORP.
L. 427. 440 (2004) ("Professional firms' reputations can bond their promises.., to monitor clients on
behalf of investors and others. Large professional firms in effect rent their reputations to their clients..
• ."). Financial statements are, of course, audited by outside accounting firms. This may happen even
if it were not mandated by the securities laws. In the Netherlands, 84% of listed firms chose to have
their financials audited, even though it was not mandatory. See Willem Buijink, Evidence-Based
FinancialReportingRegulation, 42 ABACUS 296, 296 (2006). Furthermore, as others have suggested,
companies could purchase insurance for the accuracy of their financial statements. See, e.g., Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The FinancialStatement InsuranceAlternative to Auditor
Liability, 52 UCLA L. REv. 413, 427 (2004) (suggesting that "[f]inancial statement insurance can be
created as an optional alternative to traditional financial statement auditing"). "Bad" financial
statements then will not crowd out "good" financial statements.
Of course, auditing. like other professional services, is also a credence good, because investors
will not be confident of an audit's quality based on anything other than the auditor's reputation. See
Ribstein, supra, at 438 39 (noting that reputation acts as a bond that provides a penalty independent
of a legal proceeding). This helps explain the substantive rules requiring auditor independence.
Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2006) (setting forth standards for accountant
auditor independence); Schedule 14A Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a101(9) (2006) (requiring disclosure of certain aspects of the relationship between registrant companies
and their independent public accountants); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3) (Supp. 2004) (providing audit
committee standards).
159. Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, Cross-AMonitoringand Corporate
Governance(Jan. 16, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=957627 (finding "strong evidence that
bank monitoring adds value"). "[S]hareholders are not the only constituency concerned with managerial
agency costs. Given the thick web of firms' contractual commitments, it should not be surprising that
other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm." Id.
at 1. Previous studies had confirmed higher stock returns to companies announcing the receipt of bank
loans. See, e.g., Charles J. Hadlock & Christopher M. James, Do Banks Provide FinancialSlack?. 57
J.FIN. 1383. 1414 (2002) (finding that "firms who exhibit small preannouncement stock-price run-ups
and those with high stock return volatility are relatively more likely to announce new bank loans"). The
announcement may have led to higher returns on a signaling theory that the bank obtained positive
private information before approving the loan. Shepherd, Tung, and Yoon's study shows that "bank
monitoring improves firm value in general." Shepherd, Tung & Yoon, supra. at 29: see also George G.
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive CorporateGovernance, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1073, 1078 (1995) ("The screening and monitoring activities of a lender produce externalities that
benefit other creditors and other stakeholders.").
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firms' audit fees. 6 ° Self-regulation is another method.' Optional government
regulation (i.e., allowing a corporation to choose whether to be regulated by the
SEC or perhaps state regulators) would be another alternative method.162
The argument that government regulation is required is also called into
question by the changing nature of investment in the securities market. First,
163
private investors now directly own a relatively small percentage of securities.
Because securities are now more likely to be institutionally owned, the need to
protect the small investor has declined. Second, equities are now much less
likely to be selected individually and much more likely to be held as part of a
"large portfolio of stocks weighted by their market capitalization,"'' 64 such as
index funds. Battacharya and Galpin report that the fraction of U.S. stock trading
volume explained by value-weighted portfolios has increased from less than
one-third in the 1920s to more than two-thirds today. 165 Modern financial theory
supports the use of this passive indexing approach, 66 which also results in the
irrelevance of firm-specific risk.
Even the SEC appears to concede that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary
in those situations where investors are assumed to be able to fend for
themselves. Small issues, securities sold under Rule 144A, and stocks traded on
the pink sheets all do not face the same disclosure requirements as other
issues. 16 7 In other words, not all securities are so different from other goods and
services that mandatory disclosure is a necessity.
In addition, not only is government mandated disclosure (and occasional
restrictions of disclosure) of information not necessary to prevent fraud, it also is
not sufficient. Disclosure is "useful only if market mechanisms are in place that
are capable of observing and interpreting the information.', 68 The Enron

160. Aloke Ghosh & Martien Lubberink, Timeliness and Mandated Disclosures on Internal
Controls Under Section 404 (Sept. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931896.
161. Self-regulation was the dominant form of regulation in British capital markets until as
recently as May 1997. SPENCER. supra note 150. at 32. Other industries, such as law, medicine, and
accounting, have all developed methods of self-regulation, "backed up in recent years by the force of
law." Id. at 32 34; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation imposed by
the NYSE).
162. See Roberta Romano, EmpoweringInvestors:A Market Approach to SecuritiesRegulation.
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2365 (1998) (proposing a securities regime where companies choose between
federal and state regulation). A recent Court decision suggests that a state actor may constitutionally
restrict a voluntary participant's First Amendment rights. See Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Ass'n
v. Brentwood Academy, 127 S. Ct. 2489. 2495-96 (2007), availableat 2007 WL 1773196.
163. The Federal Reserve Board reports that as of March 31, 2007, the household sector directly
owns less than 26% of corporate equities and less than 12% of corporate bonds. See Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, First Quarter 2007, at 89
tbl.L.212, 90 tbl.L.213 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zI.pdf
164. Utpal Bhatacharya & Neal Galpin, The Global Rise of the Value- Weighted Portfolio 1, AFA
Chicago Meetings Paper (Mar. 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=849627.
165. Id. at 3.
166. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET 402-08 (9th ed. 2007).
167. Ironically, investors in the so-called small issues are often least able to fend for themselves.
See Palmiter, supra note 149, at 36.
168. Macey, supra note 147, at 330.
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collapse exemplifies this failure of market mechanisms.' 69 As Malcolm Gladwell
argued in a recent article, Enron was not primarily about insufficient or
inaccurate disclosure. 171 Rather, the information was publicly disclosed, waiting
to be put together. 71 The market, however, simply did not assimilate this
disclosed information, at least not quickly. 172 Instead, the Wall Street Journal
published an article in September 2000, which led a financier to short the stock
in November, followed by a story in Barron'sin March 2001, which led to more
analysts and journalists examining the company.1'7 As Gladwell notes, whereas
to break the Watergate story the reporters needed an inside source, to break
Enron the reporter merely 4 called an accounting professor and met directly with
Enron financial officials.'
Voluminous or confusing disclosure can overwhelm and mystify rather than
inform. 17 Enron may prove "that in an age of increasing financial complexity
the 'disclosure paradigm' the idea that the more a company tells us about its

169. Id. at 331 (observing that "[i]n the Enron collapse, the U.S. mandatory reporting system
worked fairly well").
170. Malcolm Gladwell. Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much
Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007. at 46.
17 1. See id. at 46. (quoting a reporter, Jonathan Weil, who, after looking at Enron's public filings,
stated that it took him about a month to figure out the company's financial situation because "[t]here
was a lot of noise in the financial statements, and to zero in on [the cash-flow issue] you needed to cut
through a lot of that.").
172. See id. at 46-47 (detailing how the information became known to the market); Macey, supra
note 147. at 331 (noting that "the market did an astonishingly poor job of both interpreting Enron's
disclosures and 'decoding' the information contained in the trades conducted by Enron insiders.")
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 19 (2004) (arguing that "Enron's... transactions are [] so complex that less than a critical mass
of investors can understand them in a reasonable time period").
173. See Gladwell, supra note 170, at 46-47. Macey. supra note 147. at 339-40.
174. Gladwell, supra note 170, at 47-48. He adds, "[Y]ou can't blame Enron for covering up the
existence of its side deals. It didn't; it disclosed them." Id. at 49.
175. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (examining the impact of
information overload on securities regulation). Gordon Smith, a corporate lawyer turned law professor,
observed the following:
When 1 was writing disclosure. 1 discovered that more isn't always better. Indeed,
some clients wanted more because they figured they could overwhelm the market.
I think they were right. We often view the market as a supercomputer, and it is in
a way, but the market still relies on individuals to plow through the disclosure,
and a lot of it is almost impenetrable or unfathomable.
Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate Blog: Business. Law, Economics & Society.
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/06/the-future of s.html (June 3, 2005, 12:09 EST). "Companies
have every incentive to disclose in high volume, not only because it provides litigation protection but
because negative disclosures are less transparent when they appear in a se[a] of other information." Id.
posted (June 3. 2005. 13:02 EST). The Enron situation was no doubt exacerbated by the complexity of
the underlying situation. Gladwell notes that members ofEnron's board, Arthur Andersen's field staff,
and Enron's ChiefFinancial Officer himself likely did not fully understand the deals Enron was doing.
Gladwell. supra note 170. at 49.
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business, the better off we are-has become an anachronism.' 176 Some
commentators have gone even further, demonstrating that under some plausible
assumptions, mandating increased disclosure of issuers
may in fact have the
177
unintended consequence of actually increasing fraud.
Finally, even if Pinto is right that securities are credence goods that
particularly depend on government mandated disclosure,'17 this contention does
not imply that the First Amendment should be inapplicable. News produced by
media corporations like the New York Times Company involves the type of
speech most protected by the First Amendment, but news is also a credence
good. 1 79 Consumers are usually unable to evaluate whether the news is "accurate
and impartial and [whether] it contains the most significant happenings of the
day.,"18 The New York Times claims on its front page that it includes "All the
News That's Fit to Print," but this is very difficult to verify. The inability of
consumers to evaluate news may in fact "invite fraud,"'' but nobody argues that
this should affect the applicability of the First Amendment.'82
Rather, even if there really is a heightened risk of fraud in the securities
context that uniquely requires government mandated disclosure, this argument
more properly addresses whether the regulations can withstand First Amendment
scrutiny and not than whether there should be First Amendment scrutiny in the
first instance. Furthermore, this does not mean that government mandated
prohibitions of nonfraudulent speech should be exempt.

176. Gladwell, supra note 170, at 50 (citing Steven Schwarcz. a professor at Duke Law School)
see also Schwarcz, supra note 172, at 11 17 (arguing that disclosure may be insufficient when the
underlying transactions are too sophisticated for even institutional investors to understand): Macey,
supra note 147, at 349 (observing that the U.S. system of mandatory disclosure "failed miserably in
Enron, and that failure appears to be pervasive rather than isolated").
177. See Paul Povel et al., Booms, Busts, and Fraud,20 REV. FIN. STUDIES (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 956209 (arguing that requiring issuers to disclose more
information could have the unintended consequence of increasing fraud).
178. See supra notes 140 51 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Charles Davis & Stephanie Craft, New Media Synergy: Emergence ofInstitutional
Conflicts ofInterest, 15 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 219, 224 (2000) ("News is a 'credence good,' a product
that must be consumed on faith alone."); cf Brian Logan & Daniel Sutter. Newspaper Quality, Pulitzer
Prizes, and Newspaper Circulation,32 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 100, 101 (2004) ("News has the character
of an experience good where consumers do not observe quality before consuming the good-or a
credence good-where the quality is not discernible even after consumption."); Mark R. Patterson, On
the Impossibility of Information Intermediaries6 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 13, 2001), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=276968 (pointing out that
the Wall Street Journal is a credence good, because its "evaluations and even its facts, may be
inaccurate"). More generally, information itself is generally a credence good. Patterson. supra. at 6.
180. John McManus, Serving the PublicandServingthe Market:A Conflict oflnterest?. 7 J. Mass
Media Ethics 196, 198 99 (1992) (concluding that news is a credence good).
181. Id. at 196.
182. Concededly the First Amendment includes a press clause; however, this does not serve to
distinguish media because as a matter of positive law the press clause actually plays a rather minor role
in protecting the freedom of the press. "Most of the freedoms the press receives from the First
Amendment are no different from the freedoms everyone enjoys ....
David A. Anderson, Freedom
of the Press. 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002).
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B. FragileNature of the CapitalMarkets
A second set of arguments either explicitly or implicitly claim that bringing
securities regulation within the ambit of the First Amendment will result in
widespread harm to the capital markets.' 83 U.S. capital markets are often seen as
the best and most successful in the world largely because of the SEC's
disclosure regulations.' 84 Any constitutional threat to these regulations would be
highly problematic. Thus the law professors' amicus brief in the Siebel Systems
case claimed that merely applying anything more than rational review to the
regulation at issue would be "an unprecedented and destabilizing step" with
"profound" consequences."'
If some securities regulations were struck down these consequences would
be even worse. Michael Siebecker, for example, recently argued that if securities
regulation were subject to high-level First Amendment scrutiny,
[p]rivate causes of action for securities fraud currently
recognized by the Supreme Court would lose their theoretical
underpinnings, and the system of forced public transparency for
public corporations and sales of securities would become
muddied by political maneuvering. Investors could be left
foundering without reliable information upon which to base
investment decisions, and gross market inefficiencies could
potentially result if market prices rested on infirm or false
factual assumptions. 86
He concludes, "Adequate regulation . . . remains essential to secure the

183. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 46, at 495 (arguing that the First Amendment should be
inapplicable to securities regulation "when disclosed information assists the market and when the
disclosure process creates and stabilizes investment vehicles").
184. See, e.g., Robert Daines & Charles M. Jones, Truth or Consequences: Mandatory Disclosure
and the Impact of the 1934 Act 4 (Jan. 2007) (on file with author) ("Commentators frequently point to
US legal rules on mandatory disclosure and its vigorous public and private enforcement as helping to
create 'liquidity, reducing capital costs and making fair market prices possible.'" (citations omitted));
Martin Shubik, CorporateControl,Efficient Markets, and the Public Good,in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND
TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 31, 33 34 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988)
("The success of the functioning of possibly the most efficient market known, the New York Stock
Exchange, has been in part due to a careful formalization of the rules of the game by its board of
governors and by the Securities and Exchange Commission.").
185. See, e.g., Brief of Law Professors, supra note 47, at 16, 21. As a foundational matter, the
mere uncertainty associated with a possible constitutional challenge may be harmful to the markets.
This is true, however, only to the degree that investors (1) deem the constitutional challenge likely to
be successful, (2) perceive the regulations as being more beneficial than harmful, and (3) do not believe
that private solutions could be reached. In addition, the antifraud provisions of securities regulation
would not be at risk.
186. Siebecker, supra note 3, at 618; see also SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365,
373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("If speech employed directly or indirectly to sell securities were totally protected,
any regulation of the securities market would be infeasible.").
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multifarious benefits that securities provide to individuals, corporations, and
governments" and is necessary "to ensure[] the integrity of the U.S. capital
markets."' 18 7 Similarly, Boyer argues that government mandated disclosure is
necessary for the market to function effectively.188
This article addresses two main responses. First, is there in fact empirical
support for the proposition that disclosure regulations are the cause of the U.S.
capital markets' success? Even if disclosure regulations were collectively the
cause, it does not imply that all individual provisions are necessarily desirable.
Second, this Article also offers a few thoughts on whether securities regulations
are likely to be struck down if courts applied the First Amendment.'89 These
responses are to some degree interrelated, in that the more the SEC could show
harm to the capital markets would result from an invalidation of a securities
regulation, the less likely it is that a court would invalidate the regulation.
1. Empirical Work on Disclosure
"Perhaps the most hotly-contested debate in the history of securities
regulation has been over the need for mandatory disclosure."' 9' There are long
lists of law review articles by prominent contributors on both sides of the issue,
some calling for the repeal of at least some parts of the mandatory disclosure
framework. 19' Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question.
Given the volume of research on capital markets, it is surprising how little
empirical evidence there really is regarding the effectiveness of the SEC's

187. Siebecker, supra note 3. at 652. 654.
188. Boyer, supra note 46, at 487. Boyer claims that government mandated disclosure is necessary
to remove "the impediments to full and fair bargaining among all participants." Id
189. For a detailed analysis of the possible results of the judicial application of the First
Amendment to securities regulation, see Drury, supra note 116. at 779-87.
190. Paredes, supra note 175, at 417; see Goshen & Parchovsky, supra note 138, at 755
("Probably the most debated issue in securities regulation is whether disclosure duties should be
mandatory."): see also F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium. Washington
University School of Law. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the Mandatory Disclosure
System (Feb. 21 22, 2003), http://law.wustl.edu/wulq/hodge/2003/.
191. See, e.g.,
Coffee, supra note 149 (providing efficiency-based arguments in favor of
mandatory disclosure); Easterbrook & Fischel. supra note 148. at 672 (noting "neither the supporters
nor the opponents of fraud and disclosure rules have made a very good case"); Fox. supra note 148, at
1338 (arguing that "we should reject issuer choice and retain the current mandatory system"); Paul G.
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1997) (suggesting "regulatory
decentralization [rather] than greater centralization"): Palmiter. supra note 149. at 4 (arguing for less
mandatory regulation): Robert Prentice. Whither Securities Regulation?Some BehavioralObservations
Regarding Proposalsfor ItsFuture, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1399 1402 (2002) (cautioning against a
deregulated securities environment); Romano, supra note 162, at 2361-64 (1998) (critiquing mandatory
federal system); Joel Seligman, The HistoricalNeedfor a Mandatory CorporateDisclosure System, 9
J. CORP.L. 1 (1983) (examining arguments supporting mandatory disclosure and listing books and
articles criticizing mandatory disclosure). Some earlier books criticizing the mandatory disclosure
system include HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) and GEORGE J.
BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND USA (1976).
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As the Council of Economic Advisors observed in 2003, "the

question of whether SEC-enforced disclosure rules actually improve the quality
of information that investors receive remains a subject
of debate among
1' 93
researchers almost seventy years after the SEC's creation."
There are some important exceptions, however.' 94 Older studies have looked
at the impact of the '33 Act on investors in new stock issues, concluding that
investors in securities issued shortly before the enactment of the '33 Act
received essentially the same returns as those who invested in securities issued

shortly after the passage of the '33 Act.'95 Another older study reached a similar

192. See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation:Evidencefrom the OTC Bulletin Board,39 J. ACCT. &ECON. 233,236 (2005) (contributing
to "a fairly limited empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure regulation"); Daires
& Jones, supra note 184, at 4 ("[U]nfortunately. ... we know little about the effects of mandatory
disclosure .. "); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, CorporateDisclosure,
and the CapitalMarkets: A Review of the EmpiricalDisclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405,
414 (2001) ("[S]urprisingly little is known about why financial report and disclosure is regulated in the
capital market"); Paul G. Mahoney & Jianping Mei, Mandatoryvs. ContractualDisclosure in Securities
Markets: Evidencefrom the 1930s, at 4 (Univ. of Va. Law School, the John M. Olin Program in Law
and
Economics
Working
Paper
No.
25.
2006),
available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 1069&context uvalwps (referring to the "relative
dearth of empirical investigation" into public regulation of securities markets); see alsoWillem Buijink,
Evidence-BasedFinancialReporting Regulation,42 ABACUS 296, 297 (2006) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure regulation has not been "evidence based," meaning that policy decisions have not been based
on scientific evidence). According to Daires and Jones, one reason for the dearth of empirical
investigation is the uniformity imposed on public disclosure by the SEC. Daines & Jones, supra, at 6.
193. See also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2003,
95 97, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf 2003 erp.pdf, quoted in Daines &
Jones. supra note 184. at 6.
194. In a series of papers comparing regulations among countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and sometimes Vishny have concluded that higher levels of investor protection are associated
with, among other things, higher stock valuations. Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnershipAround
the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999): Rafael La Porta et al., InvestorProtectionand Corporate Valuation,
57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002): Rafael La Porta et al.. Legal Determinants ofExternal Finance,52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997). In their most recent paper they concluded that their data from forty-nine countries suggested
"the development of stock markets is strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements and
a relatively low burden of proof on investors seeking to recover damages resulting from omissions of
material information from the prospectus." Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Law?, 61
J. FIN. 1, 20 (2006); see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, supra note 193, at 94 (noting that
"[s]trong legal institutions are widely recognized as providing a solid foundation for economic growth.
including the emergence of a strong corporate sector"). Cross country studies may suffer from many
confounds. In addition, the studies looked at several aspects of investor protection of which mandatory
disclosure was only one. I am aware ofno real world empirical work that examines whether prohibitions
on nonmisleading public disclosure either protect investors or result in a more efficient market.
195. Gregg A. Jarrell. The EconomicEffects ofFederalRegulationof the MarketforNew Security
Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON. 613, 638 (1981); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 121 (1964); see also Chee W. Chow, The Impacts ofAccounting Regulation
on Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Securities Acts, 58 AcCT. REV. 485, 514
(1983) (finding only limited evidence that a negative return to investors resulted from the '33 Act): cf
Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 SecuritiesAct on Investor Information and the Performanceof
New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 304-06 (1989) (showing increased dispersion of stock returns
before the '33 Act, although this may be attributable to a selection effect).
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conclusion regarding the impact of the '34 Act. 9 6 These studies did not resolve
the matter, however, perhaps because of "two shortcomings: (1) a lack of
convincing theory justifying the particular measures of stock price performance
employed in these studies; and (2) the inability to control for changing9 7market
conditions when comparing pre- and post-mandated disclosure periods."'
More recently, two studies have examined the impact of the '34 Act on
various stock-trading measures. Daines and Jones studied changes in bid-ask
spreads, commonly used as a proxy for information asymmetries, at month-end
after the first half of 1935.' Their two samples were based on common stocks
listed on the NYSE or New York Curb exchange or traded over-the-counter.1 99
They were "unable to identify specific newly required
disclosures that reduce[d]
200
information asymmetries or improved liquidity.
Mahoney and Mei also looked at companies on the NYSE; however, they
selected their sample based on whether the company had filed a registration
statement between mid-1933 and late 1935.201 They also divided their sample
using a different method, looked at daily return, volume and bid-ask quotation
data, and examined the informativeness of earnings reports following the '34
Act. They concluded as follows:
We find almost no evidence that the new disclosures required
by the securities laws-principally having to do with
management compensation and large shareholdings-reduced
informational asymmetry. We also find no evidence that
earnings reports were more informative after enactment of the
securities laws. We conclude that the securities laws did not
add measurably to the content and credibility of the NYSE's
existing disclosure requirements.2 °2
In addition, three recent studies have looked at the extension of securities

196. See George J. Benston, RequiredDisclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132, 149 (1973) (concluding that "the disclosure
provisions of the '34 Act were of no apparent value to investors").
197. Allen Ferrell, Measuring The Effects ofMandatedDisclosure.1 BERKELEY BuS. L.J. 369,
372-76 (2004) (providing a detailed critique of these early studies); see also Coffee. supra note 149.
at 718 (describing challenges to the Stigler and Bentson studies); Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman,
The SE.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382,391 (1964) (criticizing the Stigler study); Seligman,
supra note 191. at 23 (analyzing problems with the studies).
198. Daines & Jones. supra note 184. at 13.
199. Id. at 15.
200. Id. at 2. Interestingly, they found evidence that the securities acts' enforcement mechanisms
were beneficial to those companies that had been disclosing before the implementation of the Acts. Id.
at 30. This is "consistent with the idea that the public and private enforcement mechanisms created by
the act allowed [firms] to credibl[y] signal the accuracy of their disclosures." Id. at 31.
20 1. Mahoney & Mei, supra note 192, at 13.
202. Id. at 4.
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reporting requirements to companies traded over the counter. 2 3 These studies
are less sensitive to the critique that studying the initial impact of the '33 Act
and '34 Act does not tell us much about the Acts' current impact given the
emergence of""[i]nstitutional investors, securities analysis and the modern law of
securities fraud. 20 4 Two of these studies look at the extension or expansion of
reporting requirements to certain over-the-counter firms in 1964, whereas the
third examines the extension in 1999 and 2000.
Michael Greenstone and colleagues, based on a sample of roughly a quarter
of the 900 firms that first filed with the SEC after the passage of the 1964
Amendments, found a positive abnormal stock return resulting from the
increased disclosure. 2 " They attribute much of this gain to reduced agency costs,
as the cost to outsiders from insider trading declined.20 6 In contrast, Ferrell,
based on a different sample and using different methodology, found no
significant monthly abnormal excess return from the beginning of 1962 until the
end of 1964.207

Bushee and Leuz's study looked at the impact of imposing '34 Act reporting
requirements on all U.S. companies trading on the Over-The-Counter Bulletin
Board (OTCBB). Before 1999 OTCBB issuers who had never issued securities
under the '33 Act and were below certain size or security holder requirements
were exempt from the '34 Act reporting requirements. 20 8 They found that 76% of
companies not previously reporting under the '34 Act were removed from the
OTCBB, resulting in market value and liquidity costs. 2 9 Of those companies

that remained on the OTCBB and thus were compelled to report stock
returns declined, suggesting that mandatory disclosure exceeded its benefits.210
These results are not surprising, because any of the companies that thought the
benefits of reporting would exceed the costs could have voluntarily chosen to
file with the SEC. The companies that chose to stay on the OTCBB tended to be
larger, more leveraged, and less profitable than those that did not, which, due to
data availability issues, the authors cautiously report as suggesting "that an
important consequence of mandatory SEC disclosures is to push smaller firms
with lower outside financing needs into a less regulated market, rather than to

203. Bushee & Leuz. supra note 192; Michael Greenstone et al.. Mandated Disclosure,Stock
Returns and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q. J. OF ECON. 399 (2006); Allen Ferrell,
Mandated Disclosureand Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the- Counter Market (The Harvard
John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 453. 2003), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/o/h-center/.
204. Coffee, supra note 149, at 744.
205. Greenstone et al., supra note 203, at 443.
206. Greenstone et al., supra note 203. at 444. Agency costs are a possible explanation of the
results, given that companies could have voluntarily become subject to the '34 Act.
207. Ferrell, supra note 203, at 37. For a critique of Ferrell's study, see Greenstone et al., supra
note 203, at 445.
208. The size thresholds were set out in section 12(g). Issuers with assets under $10 million or
fewer than 500 securities owners-of-record were exempt from the '34 Act reporting requirements.
209. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 192, at 234-35.
210. Id. at 235-36.
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compel them to" adopt higher disclosure standards.21'
Bushee and Leuz also found a possible positive externality of extending
reporting requirements, in that the OTCBB firms that were already reporting,
whether or not voluntarily, benefitted from increased liquidity.2" 2
In general, it is fair to conclude that the evidence on the overall desirability
of the disclosure regime is mixed. The fact that these studies look at the overall
impact on companies being subject to U.S. securities acts without separating the
impact of different provisions is part of the problem.2 3 Even if governmentmandated disclosure is desirable for an efficient capital market, this conclusion
does not mean that restrictions on the disclosure of accurate and nonmisleading
information are justifiable. SEC regulations that prohibit disclosure render the
market less efficient if some of the prohibited disclosure includes nonmisleading
material information.214 The arguments for market failure in the provision of
information really apply only to the mandatory disclosure provisions. They do
not apply to the restrictions, at least to the degree that the restrictions reach
nonmisleading disclosure.
Furthermore, even if the net impact of imposing mandatory disclosure is
positive or negative, the impact of individual provisions may be either. Thus,
one explanation for the different results is that securities regulation included
different provisions at different times. For example, in 1964, disclosure of
forward looking information did not enjoy the safe harbor protection that it had
in 1999.215
The argument against disclosure regulation in some instances is more
compelling. For example, Jarrell and Bradley looked at the impact of the
Williams Act of 1968.216 The Williams Act requires would-be acquirers to
disclose their business plans and delay implementation, thereby ensuring that
investors have adequate information and time to make a decision.2 17 The

211. Id. at 261.
212. Id.at 236. If small-cap investors refuse to trade on the Pink Sheets then that would also lead
to an increase in liquidity due to increased investor demand for OTCBB firms. Id.
213. It is also worth remembering that securities regulations do not require full disclosure. In fact,
full disclosure is only required when there is a duty to disclose, and in many instances a company has
no duty to disclose even material information. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n. 17
(1988) (noting that silence will not be actionable unless there is a duty to disclose). Thus, when
company Xis about to buy company Y,but before an announcement is required. the shares of company
Y are really worth something close to the takeover premium that company X will pay. The issue is thus
actually about degree of pricing efficiency rather than whether it exists or not.
214. If the information is neither material nor misleading, then it is hard to see why the SEC
restricts it.
215. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67. § 102, 109 Stat. 737.
749. In fact, before 1973 the SEC actively discouraged the disclosure of forward looking information.
See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 33-9984,
34-9984 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973).
216. Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley. The EconomicEffects of FederalandState Regulations
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371, 373 (1980).
217. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 454-55 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000)).
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problem, however, is this disclosure and delay allows other potential acquirers to
free-ride on the first acquirer's bid. If a potential acquirer chooses to bid as well,
the first acquirer's costs increase, or the target is lost. Therefore, although the
Williams Act increased premiums that acquirers paid from 32% to 53 %,218 the
Act also reduced the number of takeover bids.219 Shareholders of targeted
companies benefitted, but shareholders of companies that would have been
targeted absent the passage of the Act lost. 220 In addition, acquirers lost the

ability to fully profit from their knowledge of how to effect valuable corporation
combinations.22' Overall, Jarrell and Bradley concluded that the takeover
regulations, "by precluding some takeovers and reducing the productivity of
others, have incurred large social costs.' 222
There also have been several studies of Regulation FD. The results 22are
4
inconclusive

223

or perhaps even indicate that the regulation has been harmful.

Finally, there is some suggestive, albeit inconclusive and sometimes
anecdotal, evidence regarding issuers' choices to go private, deregister, or list on
foreign exchanges.225 While these choices are likely motivated by more than just
the securities regulation regime, disclosure provisions may play a role given
their overarching importance. 226 This evidence suggests that the overall costs of
securities regulation may now exceed the benefits.
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an increasing number of firms
have chosen to deregister.227 Commenting on this trend, Marosi and Massoud
suggest that the SEC should consider reducing the reporting burden on smaller
companies. 228 An increasing number of companies also appear to have gone
private.229 The media reports that "[e]veryone, it seems, wants to be private. 230

218. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 216, at 389.
219. Id.at 399 ("Some investments and acquisitions that would be profitable absent the takeover
law will be deterred by the higher tender premiums under the regulations.").
220. Id. at 404.
221. Id.
222. Id.This harm, of course, is produced by both the required disclosure and by the delay.
223. See Page & Yang, supra note 13, at 26-33 (reviewing studies).
224. See Peter Talosig 111, Regulation FD Fairly Disruptive?An Increase in CapitalMarket
Inefficiency, 9 FORDHAMJ. CORP.& FIN. L. 637,714 (2004) (concluding, after a review of studies, that
"[i]nvestors have received little benefits from [Regulation FD] and many more disadvantages").
225. Deregistering and going private are not synonymous. Companies that deregister no longer
have to file reports with the SEC but can still be publicly traded on the Pink Sheets.
226. See supra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
227. Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of
Voluntary SEC Deregistrations,44 J. ACCT.& ECON. (forthcoming 2007).
228. Andriis Marosi & Nadia Massoud. Why Do Firms Go Dark?, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 421 (2007).
229. See Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A
Cross-Country Analysis (Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper Series and Legal
Studies Research Paper Series 2006). available at http://ssm.com/abstract=901769 (finding evidence
"consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during
the year following [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] enactment"); see also Ellen Engel et al., The SarbanesOxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions (May 6, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract 546626 (investigating "firms' going-private decisions in response to the
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Lastly, an increasing number of have firms have chosen to list on markets
outside the United States. Piotroski and Srinivasan found "strong evidence that
U.S. exchanges have experienced a decrease in foreign listings following the
enactment of the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act, and
that this decline cannot be fully
231
conditions.,
market
in
changes
by
explained
This evidence does not, of course, show that disclosure regulation is
unnecessary. It does, however, suggest that U.S. securities regulation is suboptimal, which could affect a decision about not only whether to apply the First
Amendment to securities regulation,232 but also whether a particular regulation
would survive.
2.

Would Securities Regulations Survive FirstAmendment Scrutiny?

The foregoing discussion is not only relevant to whether the mandatory
disclosure regime is necessary, but also relevant, if the First Amendment were
applicable, to whether challenges would be successful. Notwithstanding the lack
of clear evidence, several reasons lead to the conclusion that most securities
regulations, particularly those mandating disclosure, would survive such
challenges.233 At least one SEC rule has survived strict First Amendment
scrutiny."'
First, the Central Hudson standard of review is flexible, or as some

passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act").
230. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A GrowingAversion to Ticker Symbols, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,2007,
at C6.
231. Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of
InternationalListings31 (2007), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstract=956987. They conclude that their
"evidence is consistent with a shift in both the expected costs and benefits of a foreign listing following
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley."Id. at 1; see alsoKate Litvak. The Effect ofthe Sarbanes-OxleyAct
on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, J. CoRP. FIN. (forthcoming 2007) (finding evidence
"consistent with the view that investors expected the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to have a net negative effect
on cross-listed foreign companies"): Kate Litvak. Sarbanes-Oxleyandthe Cross-ListingPremium,105
MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Cross-ListingPremium] (finding a significant decline
in cross-listing premium for foreign companies subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compared to foreign
companies not subject to the Act). Litvak also found that "[c]ompanies that were already highdisclosing (or from high-disclosing countries) suffered the largest adverse effect." Litvak, Cross-Listing
Premium. supra.
232. Granted, the Constitution only guarantees a republican form of government, as opposed to
effective governance. See Dooley, supra note 34, at 335. To reiterate, however, if the application of the
First Amendment depends in part on the nonlegal economic context, then the effectiveness of securities
regulation would be relevant. See supranotes 129-30 and accompanying text.
233. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze specific regulations in depth, see
Page & Yang, supra note 13, at 64 81, for a thorough analysis of the First Amendment's application
to Regulation FD. See also, Drury, supra note 116, at 786-88.
234. Blount v. SEC. 61 F.3d 938, 944-48 (D.C. Cir 1995). The Blount court upheld Rule G-37
that restricted political contributions by parties involved in the municipal securities market ("pay-toplay"). The court applied strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny without deciding which level
was appropriate. Id. at 943.
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commentators have described it, indeterminate. 235 Also, in the First Amendment
context, judges may be particularly pragmatic.236 Pragmatic judges applying an
indeterminate First Amendment standard to highly valued mandatory disclosure
provisions seem likely to uphold them.23
Second, under Central Hudson, if the SEC can show, as it clearly believes,
that issuer speech may at least in some circumstances mislead potential
investors, the regulations affecting such speech would likely survive. The
Supreme Court has, for example permitted such regulation in the context of
attorney advertising. 23 Appropriate restrictions are permitted, provided they do
no more to prevent the possible deception than what is reasonably necessary.239
With respect to prohibitions on commercial speech, the SEC passed new rules,
effective December 1, 2005, that addressed some of the key 2problems
with the
40
public offering process, including First Amendment problems.
Third, judicial evaluation, regardless of the standard of review, will involve
an inquiry into the ends and means. 241 For the most part, the securities
regulation's ends-efficient securities markets and fraud prevention 242 are

235. Volokh, supra note 40, at 733 (stating that "even if Central Hudson still provides the official
test, that test is notoriously indeterminate").
236. Suzanna Sherry, HardCases Make GoodJudges, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 3, 4 (2004) (arguing that
for First Amendment cases, "pragmatic considerations rather than grand principles often determine the
outcome, producing some unpredictability but a just regime overall").
237. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1. 11 n.9 (1980) (stating that "[b]ecause of the special
character of commercial speech and the relative novelty of First Amendment protection for such speech,
we act with caution in confronting First Amendment challenges to economic legislation that serves
legitimate regulatory interests").
238. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191.203 (1982): see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1984) (observing that mandatory disclosure of truthful information posed fewer
First Amendment problems than restrictions).
239. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
240. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf. The new rules allow a much broader range of
communications between issuer and investor both before and after the filing of a registration statement.
For example, all issuers are now permitted to publish at any time during the securities registration
process all regularly released factual business information. Most issuers will also be able to
communicate regularly released forward looking information. Because mandatory prohibitions on the
publication ofnonmisleading information are one of the most constitutionally suspect areas of securities
regulation under the First Amendment, this liberalization assists the SEC in arguing that their
regulations are effectively tailored to reducing the harm. It would not be conclusive, however, in that
several kinds of issuers are not eligible for the new treatment. Interestingly, this regulatory change has
apparently not yet resulted in a behavioral change with respect to some quiet period disclosures. See
Lynn Cowan. In the 'Quiet Period,'Mum's Still the Word New Leeway to Talk oflPOs'Prospects
Gains Few Takers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2007, at C6. This suggests that even if some regulations were
struck down, the consequences might be trivial. Accord Schauer, supra note 5, at 1806 (observing that
after "thousands ofpublishers were freed from the legal obligation to register with the SEC. only twenty
took advantage of the privilege").
241. Whether the courts use intermediate or strict scrutiny may no longer matter much. See supra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Schoeman, supra note 114.
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likely to be compelling.24 3 The more contested part of any First Amendment
attack will be the means inquiry. If strict scrutiny is applied, the means must be
narrowly tailored. If intermediate Central Hudson scrutiny is applied, the means
must simply and directly advance the governmental interest and not be more
extensive than necessary.
The means seem particularly suspect with respect to SEC restrictions that
burden or restrict disclosure. Recall that commercial speech is protected because
of its value to the listeners.244 Restricting speech-at least speech that is not
false, deceptive, misleading or proposing an illegal transaction-depends on a
paternal assumption that listeners or readers will be harmed by such speech,
presumably by making an unwise investment decision. It also necessarily
assumes that the SEC can reasonably identify ex ante which types of speech will
most likely cause such harm and which will not. These restrictions appear "to
keep people in the dark for what the government believes to be their own
good. 245 If, however, the SEC can demonstrate that, in addition to restricting
truthful and nonmisleading speech, it is also restricting deceptive or misleading
speech, and that its restriction is "narrowly drawn," that would likely be

243. Boyer makes an interesting argument regarding how requiring disclosure affects the
underlying corporation:
As a matter of structure and process, the fact that certain issues must be disclosed
ensures that information on those issues will be gathered and action on those
issues taken.... The prospectus and registration statement are not printed solely
to reveal information about the offering. They are printed as a means of ensuring
that the issues they disclose have been addressed: that facts have been ascertained,
assumptions consciously formulated, and decisions made at specific junctures by
responsible parties.
Boyer. supra note 46, at 483-84.
Going beyond the registration statement, another example ofthis might be the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requiring that companies disclose whether their internal controls were adequate ornot. Not surprisingly,
companies forced to disclose inadequate controls would then improve those controls.
Simply because disclosure may affect substance, however, is not a reason for exempting securities
regulation from First Amendment coverage. Rather, if the substance is desirable, it might cut in favor
of direct regulation. See SusannaKim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacksof the DisclosureAntidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to SecuritiesRegulation. 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 149 (2006)
(arguing in favor of direct regulation). But see Schwarcz. supra note 172. at 27 (arguing against direct
regulation). If a state decides that companies' internal controls should be enhanced, it can simply require
it directly. Alternatively, the substantive impact of a disclosure regulation would be merely another
interest that the government could use to j ustify its regulation. and the means, requiring disclosure, is
subject to scrutiny.
There may also be a harmful effect to this disclosure. Geoffrey Manne argues that "forced
disclosure may induce unwanted responses" because disclosure affects the relative costs of different
kinds ofbehavior. Geoffrey A. Manne. The HydraulicTheory ofDisclosureRegulation andOther Costs
ofDisclosure,57 ALA. L. REV. 473,477 (2007). Corporate conduct will thus be shifted on the margins
towards lower cost activities, even if these activities are "less beneficial than the regulated, deterred
behavior." Id.
244. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
245. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.. 514 U.S. 476. 497 (1995) (Stevens. J., concurring); see also
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976) ("[T]he
State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in
ignorance.").
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adequate. 246 The Supreme Court has already noted that "the free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be
regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from
the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful. 24
Broadly speaking, the least important provisions of the securities regulation
regime, like those burdening the disclosure of nonmisleading information, are
most likely to be struck down. The most important of these provisions, such as
those mandating disclosure of material commercial information, appear unlikely
to be struck down.
V.

CONCLUSION

The arguments that the First Amendment should not apply to securities
regulation because securities are uniquely different from other products or that
capital markets must necessarily be regulated are unpersuasive, particularly
since there are viable alternatives to a mandatory federal securities regime. Even
accepted on their terms, these arguments do not supply a justification for an
exemption so much as justify some or all of the mandatory disclosure
requirements withstanding First Amendment scrutiny. These arguments offer
little, if any, justification for securities regulations that restrict or burden speech.
Similarly, they do not appear to address issues such as compelling companies to
carry shareholders' speech.248
The application of the First Amendment to securities regulation, however, is
not as troublesome as one might think.24 9 The argument here should not be
250
characterized as a Lochner-like argument in favor of laissez-faire economics.
It seems more likely that most securities regulations facing First Amendment
scrutiny would survive. Even if they were struck down, the consequences are

246. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618. 624 (1995) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980)) (stating the Central Hudson three
prong test for speech that is not misleading or unlawful); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-69
(1993) (stating that where nonmisleading speech is regulated along with misleading speech, the
regulation must pass the Central Hudson test).
247. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S., 626, 646 (1985).
248. Boyer's defense of the inapplicability of the First Amendment to speech in the context of
proxy contests relies on the general reasoning that the greater power includes the lesser power (i.e..
because state law creates the corporation, the state and the SEC can also govern the relationship
between different members of the corporation). The Supreme Court had previously accepted this line
of reasoning in the context of a challenge to a statue that restricted casino advertising even as it allowed
casinos. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328. 346 (1986) ("[1]t is
precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition ofthe underlying conduct
that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but
reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising."). This reasoning has since been discredited.
See 44 Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484. 509-10 (1996).
249. Admittedly, one possible consequence of a securities regulation being struck down under the
First Amendment would be the state achieving the same effect through direct regulation. See supranote
244.
250. Boyer, supra note 46. at 477.
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unlikely to be disastrous. The end result-that regardless of the level of scrutiny
the SEC would have to justify its regulations, particularly with respect to
restrictions on the disclosure of truthful nonmisleading information-would
likely result in better, more effective securities regulation and consequently
stronger capital markets.
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